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Preface
The main purpose of this book is to help young accountants
and students to understand the existing rules of professional
conduct applicable to the accounting profession—why each
rule seemed desirable, how it is being interpreted in particular
situations, how it fits in a logical pattern of sensible conduct
for certified public accountants, not only in the interest of
society as a whole, but in their own self-interest.
By rearranging the subject matter of the rules according to
general classes of objectives, an effort has been made to show
the profession's own conception of its obligations to the public
as a whole, its responsibilities to its clients, and proper rela
tions among its members. This is the "professional viewpoint,"
the "approach" to public accounting practice. Without under
standing the principles on which this viewpoint is founded, it
must be difficult to deal with scores of problems that continu
ally arise in practice. Yet the rules of conduct, which reveal
these principles, are little studied in the schools or elsewhere.
The strictly limited purpose of this book has deliberately
narrowed its scope. The book does not attempt to appraise
the ethics of the accounting profession in the light of philo
sophical concepts of ethical conduct in general: it does not
argue moral questions. It does not offer a complete historical
description of the evolution of each rule—occasional refer
ences of this nature are made only when needed to clarify
present meanings. The book does not compare the rules of
the accounting profession with those of other professions,
except in a few instances to illuminate the discussion.
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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
W H Y RULES A R E NEEDED
One definition of civilized society might be " A mass of
rules." Wherever men form groups there are rules, written
or unwritten. T h e family has rules about going to bed, get
ting up, eating, homework, and behavior. A s the civilized
groups grow larger, communities, towns, cities, states, nations
develop ordnances, statutes and regulations; social circles
evolve rules of etiquette (which, though unwritten, are obeyed
better than some l a w s ) ; clubs find need of by-laws; and voca
tional associations, among them professional societies, form
codes of ethics, or rules of professional conduct.
Rules are absolutely essential to organized cooperation.
The nature of the individual is instinctively egoistic and self
ish. T h e absence of rules is anarchy, a chaotic clash of selfinterests, which gets the group nowhere. T o protect the inter
ests of the group as a whole against the anti-social instincts
of the individual is a sine qua non of group effort. Each mem
ber of the group, accepting the discipline over his own selfish
impulses, receives in return protection against the selfish im
pulses of others.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rules of professional conduct have this distinction from
other types of rules—they are designed not only to advance
the group interest of those who constitute the profession, but
also the interests of those who are served by members of
the group—that is, the public. T h i s is not wholly altruistic.
It stands to reason that the opportunity of a profession to
[1]
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serve the public will be widened if the public is convinced that
members of the profession are required to protect the public
interest.
This truism is clearer in its application to the accounting
profession than to any other. Doctors, lawyers, and other
professional men render services which are of immediate con
cern only to the person who receives them (though society as
a whole is, of course, affected indirectly); but the services
of a certified public accountant, which consist largely of ex
pressing opinions on financial statements, are frequently of
as immediate concern to large numbers of persons who never
see the accountant as they are to the client himself.
The very existence of the accounting profession depends on
public confidence in the determination of certified public ac
countants to safeguard the public interest. This confidence
can be maintained only by evidence of both technical compe
tence and moral obligation. One item of evidence is promul
gation and enforcement of rules of professional conduct.
These rules, then, are not meaningless mouthings of ideal
ists remote from reality; they are not arbitrary dogma im
posed by a professional hierarchy upon a helpless rank and
file; they are not inspired by a sadistic pleasure in the irritation
of those who have to observe them. The rules of professional
conduct of the accounting profession are in part a pledge to
the public that in consideration of public confidence the pro
fession will protect the public interest; and in part a code of
behavior designed to protect the profession itself against the
selfish impulses of individual members.
ORIGIN OF RULES
Where do these rules originate? In the American Institute
of Accountants, the national organization of certified public
[2]
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accountants; in state societies of certified public accountants;
and in state boards of accountancy in certain states whose
laws empower the boards to make such rules. While not iden
tical, the rules of these various bodies are today essentially
uniform. Their substance is the same, though the words may
differ. The rules of the Institute govern the professional con
duct of a greater number of certified public accountants than
those of any other organization (since the Institute is the
national body), and are also more widely known outside the
profession. They have been adopted in whole or in part by
many of the state societies. In this book, therefore, the Insti
tute's rules will be the basis of discussion.
EVOLUTION
These rules have developed by the evolutionary process
over a period of more than thirty years. They did not spring
full-blown from the mind of any individual. They are the
product of hundreds of minds, guided by the experience of
decades. M a n y of them were adopted as the result of inci
dents which were considered unfortunate, though not previ
ously prohibited in specific terms.
ENFORCEMENT
The Institute's rules of professional conduct derive their
authority from the by-laws of the Institute, which provide
that the council, sitting as a trial board, may admonish, sus
pend, or expel a member or an associate who is found guilty,
after a hearing, of "an act discreditable to the profession,"
or of infringing any of "the rules of professional conduct as
approved by the council." It should be noted that any act
held to be discreditable to the profession may be grounds for
discipline, as well as violation of a specific rule. In other words,
[3]
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while the rules enumerate many prohibited acts they do not
purport to be all inclusive, and a member is under obligation
to exercise his judgment and his conscience in doubtful areas
not covered by the rules.
P L A N O F DISCUSSION
The philosophy underlying the rules of professional con
duct is more clearly discernible if they are studied not in
numerical order, which is the chronological order, but are
grouped according to purposes and importance. There are at
this time sixteen rules, of which ten are primarily intended
to promote the confidence of the public, including clients, and
six are primarily intended to maintain orderly and cooperative
relations among members of the Institute themselves. They
will be discussed here in the order of importance within these
classifications.

[4]

II. T H E INTEREST OF T H E PUBLIC
CHAPTER 1

Independence
The professional certified public accountant, " i n practice,"
offers his services not to one employer but to the public, or at
least to a large segment of the public, the business and finan
cial community. This is undoubtedly why he came to be known
as a "public" accountant, to distinguish him from his col
leagues privately employed. The extent to which the public
accepts his services will answer the question whether he will
be able to make a living or not, and whether he will attain a
position of respect and influence in his community, which are
the reasonable aspirations of every intelligent man.
MAINTAINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
The certified public accountant's public consists of innumer
able actual and potential clients, as well as other actual and
potential "consumers" of the accountant's work—such as
bankers and investors—who will largely influence his fortunes.
It is natural that the profession should attempt to assure this
public that the certified public accountant is keenly and con
tinually conscious of its interests. One appropriate means of
accomplishing this purpose is the adoption, publication and
enforcement of rules of professional conduct designed to pre
vent situations which the public might regard as adverse to
its interests.
[5]
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IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENCE
Among the most important of the American Institute of
Accountants rules of professional conduct are five, or nearly
one third of the total number, which are intended directly or
indirectly to fortify public confidence in the certified public
accountant's independence. This is sufficient indication of the
importance which the profession attaches to the concept of
independence, and justifies a general consideration of the sub
ject before a detailed analysis of the five related rules.
Only a moment's reflection is necessary to perceive why
independence is the keystone in the structure of the accounting
profession. A principal function of the certified public account
ant is auditing—generally with the purpose of expressing an
opinion on the financial statements of his client, commonly
known as "certifying" the financial statements. The prime
purpose of this opinion is to add to the credibility of the state
ments in the eyes of outsiders who for one reason or another
are interested in the financial position and operating results
of the business—for example, credit grantors, stockholders,
government regulatory agencies, potential investors and finan
cial analysts. Clearly they would set no great store by the
certified public accountant's opinion or certificate if they were
not confident of his independence of judgment, as well as
his technical competence. Technically competent accountants
may be employed by corporations as part of their own staffs
to keep accounts and make up their statements. The basic dif
ferentiation between privately employed accountants and pro
fessional practitioners is in their responsibilities, moral or
legal, to the corporation or the public, and in the extent to
which their relationship may tend to influence their judgment.
In the last analysis, therefore, it is his independence which is
the certified public accountant's economic excuse for existence.
[6]
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W H A T IS I N D E P E N D E N C E ?
Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to de
fine either generally or in its peculiar application to the certi
fied public accountant. Essentially it is a state of mind. It is
partly synonymous with honesty, integrity, courage, character.
It means, in simplest terms, that the certified public accountant
will tell the truth as he sees it, and will permit no influence,
financial or sentimental, to turn him from that course. Every
one will applaud this ideal, but a cynical world requires more
than a mere declaration of intention if it is to stake its money
on the accountant's word. Therefore the profession has pub
licly laid its heaviest penalties on those who breach the un
written contract of independence, and, in addition, has pro
scribed specific acts and modes of behavior which might raise
a question as to the independence of its members. In other
words, the rules not only provide for punishment of members
who are not independent; they also prohibit conduct which
might arouse a suspicion of lack of independence. Objective
standards of independence have thus been introduced into the
code. It is not enough for the member to do what he thinks
is right. H e must also avoid behavior which could lead to an
inference that he might be subject to improper influences. The
accounting profession must be like Caesar's wife. T o be suspected is almost as bad as to be convicted.
SEC O N I N D E P E N D E N C E
That this subject is more than academic is indicated by the
lively interest of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
whose fundamental purpose is to protect the interests of in
vestors. The S E C has statutory authority to require financial
statements of registrants to be audited by "independent certi
fied or public accountants." The S E C has adopted, and twice
[7]
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amended, a rule which states its concept of independence
(Rule 2 - 0 1 of Regulation S - X ) . The rule now reads, in part,
as follows:
"(a) The Commission will not recognize any certified public ac
countant or public accountant as independent who is not in fact inde
pendent. For example, an accountant will not be considered independent
with respect to any person in whom he has any substantial interest, di
rect or indirect, or with whom he is, or was during the period of report,
connected as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or
employee.
"(b) In determining whether an accountant is in fact independent
with respect to a particular registrant, the Commission will give appro
priate consideration to all relevant circumstances including evidence
bearing on all relationships between the accountant and that registrant,
and will not confine itself to the relationships existing in connection
with the filing of reports with the Commission."

Under this rule the Commission on a number of occasions
has considered the independence of accountants who had cer
tified statements before it. In 1944, for the guidance of the
accounting profession, it issued a release summarizing all its
previous statements and decisions on the subject, twenty in
number.
In most of the specific cases summarized in this release, the
Commission found that the specific objective standards of in
dependence set forth in Rule 2 - 0 1 had been violated. In several
cases, however, the Commission stated that the accountants
could not be considered independent because of "relation
ships," not specifically prohibited in the rule, which existed
between themselves and their clients, even though no evidence
was cited that the accountants were actually influenced by these
relationships to color their reports, or to conceal or misstate
material facts.
In discussing this release and referring particularly to the
[8]
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"There are two approaches to the problem of independence. One is
the application of what have been called objective standards, that is,
rules describing certain relationships, which the accountant must avoid
or be found lacking in independence. An example is the generally ac
cepted rule prohibiting the holding by an accountant of a substantial
financial interest in the company which he audits. The other approach
originates in the recognition that independence is an attitude of mind
and a manifestation of integrity and character. Those who hold this
view maintain that independence should be challenged only for specific
cause, such as lack of full disclosure, or wilful or careless misstatement,
but not merely because an accountant has rendered a client various pro
fessional services generally recognized as entirely proper, while serving
also as independent auditor.
"In clarifying the position of the professional certified public ac
countant, proper weight should be given to both points of view. Char
acter, integrity, and enlightened self-interest are the fundamental bases
of independence. The profession itself readily agrees that one should
not audit his own accounts, but it does not recognize the validity of an
assertion that an auditor impairs his independence merely by helping the
client to interpret and record a single transaction. Between these two
extremes there could be many debatable situations.
"It would be unfair to impute subconscious bias as ground for find
ing an accountant to be lacking in independence when no reasonable ob
jective standard has been violated and there is no evidence of an error
of omission or commission. The accountant should not be put into the
position of being judged on the unprovable working of his mind. If an
auditor were to avoid all relationships which might conceivably induce
a bias in his subconscious mind, he would have to work in a social
vacuum.
"The purpose of the Securities and Exchange Commission in giving
attention to the subject of independence presumably relates to the re
liability of the information made available for the benefit of investors.
The Commission wishes reasonable assurance that auditors who certify
financial statements will express honest and impartial opinions. If audi
tors maintain relationships which are obviously inconsistent with this
purpose, the Commission has the right to consider them not independent
under its rules. If no such obviously inconsistent relationship appears
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to exist, the Commission should have before it evidence that the opinion
of the auditor is in fact not honest or impartial before it holds him not
independent."

CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Another indication of the public interest in the independence
of certified public accountants arose in proceedings before a
committee of the United States Senate.
A t a hearing of a Senate subcommittee in 1943, it was
brought out that the Defense Supplies Corporation had caused
an examination to be made by certified public accountants to
determine whether certain claims against D S C conformed to
rules laid down in advance. Among the claimant companies
were some for which the accountants concerned also acted as
independent auditor. A Senator questioned whether the same
accountants should act in both capacities. " D o you think," he
asked, "that any company is wholly independent of their best
customers?" Later on, the same Senator, in questioning a
representative of the accounting firm concerned, said: " O f
course I am not intimating that you could not do both
honestly."
The American Institute of Accountants wrote the Senator
in part as follows:
"The professional certified public accountant in public practice has
two things to offer—one, his technical skill and knowledge based on
varied experience; the other, his disinterested and objective viewpoint
and his reputation for complete integrity. Others may possess equivalent
technical skill and knowledge in specific fields, but only the certified
public accountant in public practice may be presumed to have an inde
pendent objective and impartial viewpoint on all facts which come under
his review.
"This is the foundation of professional accounting practice. It is the
reason why reports and opinions of professional certified public account
ants are of value to banks and other credit grantors, to stockholders,

[10]
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prospective investors, to government agencies and to others who desire
information about corporate financial affairs. When such persons see
the opinion of a professional certified public accountant appended to
financial statements, they know that those statements have been reviewed
by an independent and impartial expert who has no axe to grind. This
is undoubtedly the reason why the Securities and Exchange Commission
requires audits by independent accountants of financial statements of
companies registered with the Commission.
"Knowing as they do that their reputation for independence and in
tegrity is their principal asset, certified public accountants are impelled
by enlightened self-interest, as well as by traditions of professional ethics
with which they are inculcated as a part of their training and by their
own sense of personal pride, to hew to the line and let the chips fall
where they may.
"These characteristics of the profession are well known in the busi
ness world, and the reports of certified public accountants are generally
accepted and often required by business and financial executives. In
government circles, however, the situation sometimes seems to be not
quite so clearly understood. Several instances have been called to our
attention in which members of Congress or government officials have
apparently assumed that certified public accountants are advocates of the
interests of their clients.
"I am sure it will be clear to you on a moment's reflection that if
the profession were to lose its reputation for independence, its opportu
nities for service would be drastically limited. That is why it is a matter
of some concern to us that a United States Senator should ask whether
an accounting firm can be independent of its clients. The answer is
that if they could not be independent of their clients they would prob
ably not be in practice. The mere fact that the question was asked,
however, might lead many persons unfamiliar with the profession to as
sume that the answer was in the negative."
The Senator replied in part as follows:
"Notwithstanding all that you say with respect to the disinterested
and objective viewpoint and the reputation for complete integrity of the
professional certified public accountant, it seems to me to be of doubt
ful wisdom, to say the least, for a government corporation to engage
accountants to audit claims against it made by some of the firm's best
clients whether or not it is questionable practice for accountants to be
serving two masters which have adverse interests.
[11]
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"I believe I am not mistaken in thinking that an accountant is fre
quently called upon to exercise independent judgment in the application
of accounting principles and that questions as to the application of these
principles frequently arise on which experts can honestly differ. There
fore even though an accountant is not an advocate of the interest of
his client I feel that it is in the nature of things quite possible for him
to be, perhaps unconsciously, influenced in the exercise of his indepen
dent judgment where he undertakes to audit a claim filed by one of his
best clients.
"Surely it would be improper for a law firm which was retained by
an oil company to advise the Defense Supplies Corporation with respect
to the legality of claims filed by that company. I will concede that the
analogy is not complete to the extent that lawyers are advocates while,
as you say, accountants are not. However, I do not think the compari
son is wholly unfair since in each case the exercise of judgment based
upon professional knowledge and training is required."

This incident raised a question of fundamental importance,
Is the independence of the certified public accountant impaired
if he simultaneously renders professional services to two or
more persons whose interests are, or may be, in conflict? The
profession's answer to this question is given in the following
resolution of the council of the American Institute of Account
ants, adopted in M a y 1944:
W H E R E A S , Independent public accountants have been called upon by
governmental agencies and others to undertake on their behalf examina
tions of the accounts of corporations for whom the accountants have
been acting as regular auditors; and
W H E R E A S , Questions have been raised as to the propriety of select
ing for such examinations the public accountants who are the regular
auditors of such corporations because of the possibility of a conflict of
interests; and
W H E R E A S , Independence of viewpoint is one of the essential quali
fications of the public accounting profession in that reports made by
auditors for their clients are quite generally intended to be used and
are used by third parties such as creditors, stockholders, directors and
others whose interests are frequently diverse;

[12]
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B E IT RESOLVED, That it is the opinion of council of the American
Institute of Accountants assembled at its regular semiannual meeting
on May 9, 1944:
That an independent public accountant may properly undertake ac
counting or auditing engagements for or on behalf of government agen
cies or other third parties involving the accounts of a regular client,
provided his relationship to the various parties interested is fully
disclosed.

This conclusion cannot be challenged successfully. When
ever he certifies a financial statement the certified public ac
countant is potentially, at least, rendering a service to two or
more parties whose interests may come into conflict—manage
ment and stockholder, borrower and lender, purchaser and
seller. H e may, and often does, serve simultaneously com
petitors in the same line of business, without fear on the part
of either client that he will favor the one or the other. It is
the peculiar obligation of the certified public accountant,
which no other profession has to impose on its members, to
maintain a wholly objective and impartial attitude toward the
affairs of the client whose financial statements he certifies.
The certified public accountant acknowledges a moral respon
sibility (and under the Securities Act this is made a legal and
financial responsibility) to be as mindful of the interests of
strangers who may rely on his opinion as of the interests of
the client who pays his fee. This is at the same time a heavy
burden and a proud distinction. It marks the certified public
accountant as an individual of the highest integrity; a toughminded technician whose judgment cannot be unbalanced by
the strongest pressures, who stakes a hard-earned profes
sional reputation on his ability to express a fair and just
opinion on which all concerned may rely; in the broad sense,
a highly useful servant to society as a whole.
[13]
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SIGNIFICANCE OF INDEPENDENCE
Consider the opportunities for service open to one who
earns this description. In this, the most complex economy of
all time, trustworthy data on the financial position and results
of operations of business enterprises, which are society's in
struments of production, are essential bases for credit and
investment, price policies, taxation, government regulation,
wage negotiations, distribution of dividends and bonuses, and
other vital functions. Accounting is the only language in which
the necessary financial data can be expressed. The certified
public accountant, therefore, in providing accounting state
ments which all concerned may accept as disinterested expres
sions, based on technically sound procedures and experienced
judgment, may serve as a kind of arbiter, interpreter, and
umpire among all the varied interests. Thereby he can elimi
nate the necessity for costly separate investigations by each
party at interest, as well as endless doubts, delays, misunder
standings, and controversies which are so much sand in the
economic machine.
T H E RULES RELATED TO INDEPENDENCE
The five rules of the Institute related in part to the ac
countant's independence are, in order of importance, as fol
lows: Rule 5, on false or misleading statements; Rule 9, on
contingent fees; Rule 13, on financial interest in a client's
business; Rule 3, on commissions and brokerage; Rule 4, on
occupations incompatible with public accounting.

[14]
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False or Misleading Statements
Rule 5. In expressing an opinion on representations in
financial statements which he has examined, a member or an
associate shall be held guilty of an act discreditable to the
profession if:
(a) He fails to disclose a material fact known to him
which is not disclosed in the financial statements but dis
closure of which is necessary to make the financial statements
not misleading; or
(b) He fails to report any material misstatement known
to him to appear in the financial statement; or
(c) He is grossly negligent in the conduct of his examina
tion or in making his report thereon; or
(d) He fails to acquire sufficient information to warrant
expression of an opinion, or his exceptions are sufficiently
material to negative the expression of an opinion; or
(e) He fails to direct attention to any material departure
from generally accepted accounting principles or to disclose
any material omission of generally accepted auditing pro
cedure applicable in the circumstances.

The most effective reinforcement of an accountant's inde
pendence is the requirement that he tell the truth without fear
or favor.
The most important of the rules of professional conduct
of the American Institute of Accountants is Rule 5. Strictly
speaking, it is not a rule of "ethics" at all. It is essentially a
blunt pronouncement that dishonesty or carelessness will be
rewarded with the heaviest penalties. But it is more than that,
too. It is also a requirement that members of the Institute in
[15]
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their capacity as independent auditors must be governed by
"generally accepted accounting principles" and "generally ac
cepted auditing procedure."
U n t i l 1941 the comparable rule of the Institute simply stated
that a member was liable to discipline if he wilfully, or through
gross negligence, prepared or certified a false or misleading
statement. But it did not hold the member to any technical
standard of performance, either in the scope or quality of his
examination or in the presentation of the financial statements
on which he expressed his professional opinion. In other
words, under the old rule the individual's judgment was untrammeled in deciding what was a sufficient audit and what
was a proper balance-sheet and income statement.
GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING PROCEDURE
In both areas there is wide latitude for judgment. Modern
auditing is based on testing and sampling, and the extent of
the tests and samples depends on the scope and effectiveness
of internal check and accounting control in the establishment
under audit. A s early as 1917, the Institute recognized that
some objective standard of auditing procedure was desirable,
both as a guide to the profession and as information to the
public. A n effort was made to indicate such a standard in a
pamphlet entitled "Approved Methods for the Preparation
of Balance-Sheet Statements," prepared by the Institute and
published by the Federal Reserve Board. In 1929 the pamph
let was revised, under the title "Verification of Financial
Statements." In 1934 correspondence between the Institute
and the N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange was published in a pamph
let, "Audits of Corporate Accounts," in which a philosophy
of auditing was expressed in general terms. In 1936 the Insti
tute replaced the old Federal Reserve Board bulletin with a
[16]
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new one, "Examination of Financial Statements by Independ
ent Public Accountants," in which this philosophy was applied
to a typical audit program. In 1939 the Institute's committee
on auditing procedure began the publication of a series of
"Statements on Auditing Procedure"—now 2 2 in number—
which discuss in some detail the manner in which the auditor
may properly satisfy himself as to the validity of various
items in financial statements and express his opinion on them.
In addition to these official statements numerous articles have
been published in the professional journals, and papers have
been read at meetings of the professional societies on various
aspects of auditing procedure.
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES
A similar development has been taking place in the field
of accounting. There, too, is wide latitude for individual
judgment. The need for objective standards to guide purely
personal judgment, and to restrain pure whim or prejudice,
has become almost universally recognized.
The literature of accounting, and the practices of corpora
tions whose reports were published, have always served as a
guide to the profession, and there has always been wide agree
ment among certified public accountants as to what constituted
good accounting practice. Developments of the past twenty
years, however, have heightened public interest in authorita
tive statements of accounting principles, and have emphasized
the desirability of conscious effort to accelerate progress. In
the correspondence with the New Y o r k Stock Exchange men
tioned above, which was published in 1934, the Institute put
forward a number of broad principles which it believed to be
generally accepted. In 1938 the Institute's committee on ac[17]
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counting procedure, with the aid of a permanent research de
partment, began publication of a series of "Accounting Re
search Bulletins"—now 25 in number—which express the
committee's opinions as to the best accounting practice in
dealing with various specific types of transactions, and discuss
the applicable principles.
In the meantime, the American Accounting Association,
composed largely of teachers of accounting, had been giving
a good deal of attention to the question of formalizing state
ments of accounting principles, and had issued several pro
nouncements and several monographs on various aspects of
the subject, all of which have stimulated discussion and clari
fied basic issues.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, since its creation
in 1934, has issued accounting regulations and releases from
time to time, indicating principles and practices to be followed
in the preparation of financial statements of registrants.
A l l these activities resulted in the publication in the profes
sional journals of articles and papers presented at meetings
of professional societies, on a multitude of questions of ac
counting principle. A respectable literature on "generally
accepted accounting principles" was thus developed.
The standard short form of auditor's report originally rec
ommended by the Institute in its correspondence with the New
Y o r k Stock Exchange in 1933, and accepted by both the
Exchange and the S E C (with certain subsequent modifica
tions) embodies a clause that the financial statements have
been prepared " i n accordance with generally accepted account
ing principles." Since early 1941, this form of certificate has
also included a statement that the auditors' examination was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards applicable in the circumstances.
[18]
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ANALYSIS OF RULE 5
In view of all these developments, therefore, the Institute
in 1941 amplified its rule providing penalties for false and
misleading statements by its members, to include provision
for compliance with generally accepted accounting principles
and generally accepted auditing procedure. The present rule
is reprinted at the head of this chapter.
The language of the introductory clause may require some
comment. "Expressing an opinion" is the equivalent of "certi
fying" in the old rule. The common phrase "certify financial
statements" has for many years been avoided by accountants
who believe it carries implications of precision inappropriate
in an area where judgment inevitably plays so large a part as
in accounting. The auditor does not "guarantee the accuracy"
of financial statements, as the word "certify" might imply.
Based upon the information he is able to obtain within the
scope of his examination, he expresses a professional opinion
on the fairness of the representations made.
"Expressing an opinion on representations in financial state
ments" emphasizes that the statements and the items in them
are the representations of the client, not of the auditor. It is
well established that balance-sheets and income statements
are the company's own representation of its financial position
and the results of its operations. They are prepared from
accounts kept by the company. The company must assume
primary responsibility for the accounts and the statements.
The auditor examines them, tests their validity by reference
to books of original entry and other supporting evidence in
the light of his review of the system of internal check and
accounting control, and expresses his independent, informed
opinion as to whether or not the statements fairly show what
they purport to show.
[19]
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"Guilty of an act discreditable to the profession" has
greater force than appears on its face. T h e by-laws of the
Institute (Article V , Sec. 4) provide that " A member or an
associate renders himself liable to expulsion or suspension by
the council sitting as a trial board i f . . . (d) he is held by the
council to have been guilty of an act discreditable to the pro
fession." T h e language of Rule 5 relates directly to this
provision.
Subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 5 are unmistakably clear.
Deliberate omission or distortion of material information is
inexcusable. T h e emphasis on "material" is, however, worth
noting. What this means in judging an auditor's responsibility
was well described by Samuel J . Broad, later president of the
Institute, when he was chairman of its committee on auditing
procedure:
"There should be stronger grounds for belief in respect of those items
which are relatively more important and in respect of those in which
the possibilities of material error are greater. For example, in an en
terprise with relatively few, but large, accounts receivable, the indi
vidual items themselves are more important, and the possibility of major
error is also greater, than in another enterprise which has a vast num
ber of small accounts aggregating the same total. In industry and mer
chandising, inventories are of relatively great importance in both the
balance-sheet and the statement of income, and should receive relatively
more attention than, say, the cash on hand; or again, than the inven
tories of a utility company. Similarly, accounts receivable will receive
more attention than prepaid insurance. Whether we put it in words or
not, the principle of materiality is inherent in our work."

Subsection (c) says, in effect, not only that an auditor's
failure to discover material omissions or misstatements will
not exonerate him i f he was grossly careless in his audit, but
that a grossly negligent examination or report is in itself
grounds for discipline, even i f the offender is fortunate enough
[20]
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not to have missed a material omission or misstatement. This
is a warning that sloppy work will not be tolerated, regard
less of whether or not it happens to have injurious conse
quences.
Subsection (d) introduces a relatively new concept. In
stances had come to notice in which qualifications or exceptions
in auditors' reports ("certificates") related to so many, or
such important, items in the financial statements that the
auditors' opinion on the fairness of the statements as a whole
had little value. Yet the mere appearance of his name in con
junction with a formal audit report might lend an appearance
of credibility to the statements which was unwarranted. In
1 9 3 9 , the Institute's committee on auditing procedure, in the
well-known bulletin, "Extensions of Auditing Procedure"
(Statements on Auditing Procedure, N o . 1) made the follow
ing observation on this question:
"The independent certified public accountant should not express the
opinion that financial statements present fairly the position of the com
pany and the results of its operations, in conformity with generally ac
cepted accounting principles, when his exceptions are such as to nega
tive the opinion, or when the examination has been less in scope than
he considers necessary. In such circumstances, the independent certified
public accountant should limit his report to a statement of his findings
and, if appropriate, his reasons for omitting an expression of opinion.
. . .
As previously stated, if such exceptions are sufficiently material
to negative the expression of an opinion, the auditor should refrain from
giving any opinion at all, although he may render an informative re
port in which he states that the limitations or exceptions relating to the
examination are such as to make it impossible for him to express an
opinion as to the fairness of thefinancialstatements as a whole."

Subsection (e) introduces the major extension of respon
sibility incorporated in the rule when it was amended in 1941.
N o longer can an auditor plead that he has done his full duty
by seeing to it that there is "full disclosure" of all material
[21]
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transactions in the financial statements, regardless of whether
the accounting is in accordance with generally accepted prin
ciples or not. For example, it is not enough for the statement
to show clearly that a receipt was included in income, if good
accounting would require it to be credited to another account.
The auditor has the responsibility of directing attention in
his report to this deviation from generally accepted account
ing principles.
Similarly, it is no longer enough for the auditor to excuse
a failure to discover a material error in the accounts by saying
that he had made what he considered a sufficiently extensive
examination and had no reason to doubt that the accounts
fairly reflected the facts. H e cannot avoid censure or penalty
if it is shown that there was, without disclosure, a material
omission of steps that other competent and conscientious audi
tors would have taken in the same circumstances—that he had
omitted any generally accepted auditing procedure applicable
in the circumstances—or, if he had omitted such a procedure,
either because it was unreasonable or impracticable or because
he considered it unnecessary, that he had not disclosed the
omission in his report.
F o r example, generally accepted auditing procedure is held
to require confirmation of accounts receivable, if they are ma
terial in amount, by direct communication with debtors. The
extent of the sample to be tested, and the precise method of
confirmation (i.e., positive or negative) are left to the audi
tor's judgment. In some cases even when the items are mate
rial it may be unreasonable or impracticable to insist on such
confirmation, and the auditor may be able to satisfy himself
by other means as to the validity of the receivables as shown
by the books; but in such cases he will nevertheless be subject
to charges of misconduct if he fails to disclose in his report,
[22]
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by exception or explanation, as may be indicated, that the
generally accepted procedure has been omitted.*
Clearly these are matters which fall within the area of
proper professional conduct, but they are of even greater sig
nificance than other questions generally associated with the
term "ethics." The civil liability of public accountants will
probably be measured by similar standards. The courts will
undoubtedly hold that the responsibility of auditors under
the law is no less than that which the organized profession of
accountancy has imposed upon its own members.
The ideas which underlie the rule did not first evolve in
1941. They had been developing through many years before,
and had been widely adopted and practiced prior to their for
mal expression as general requirements.
Rule 5, as amended in 1941, however, marked a long stride
forward by the accounting profession toward its place in the
sun. The assumption of greater responsibility is the quid pro
quo for wider recognition, public confidence, and increased
opportunities for service. Essentially, Rule 5, by sharply de
fining responsibilities, fortifies the accountant's jealous con
cern for his reputation. It advertises his obligation not to yield
to the influence of a client, to hide behind the authority of a
regulatory body, or to accept any other person's judgment as
a substitute for his own.
*For a full discussion of these matters the reader should consult the Account
ing Research Bulletins and Statements on A u d i t i n g Procedure published by the
A m e r i c a n Institute of Accountants. N o t h i n g here written should be taken to
mean that generally accepted accounting principles or auditing procedures have
been fully codified, or that there is universal agreement on how they should be
applied i n a l l circumstances. T h e r e is still plenty of latitude for i n d i v i d u a l
professional accounting judgment, and the need for experienced judgment of
this kind increases as business affairs become more complex. T h e r e is no man
ual i n w h i c h the accountant can find the answer to every question he encoun
ters. W h a t has happened is that broad limits have been placed on i n d i v i d u a l
discretion. C e r t a i n basic concepts have received general acceptance, and these
have become objective standards which curb the exercise of personal prejudice,
w h i m or caprice, and penalize ignorance or incompetence.
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Contingent Fees
R u l e 9. Professional service s h a l l not be rendered o r of
fered f o r a fee w h i c h s h a l l be contingent u p o n the findings
or results o f such service. T h i s rule does not apply to cases
i n v o l v i n g federal, state or other taxes, i n w h i c h the findings
are those of the tax authorities a n d not those of the account
ant. Fees to be fixed by courts or other p u b l i c authorities,
w h i c h are therefore o f a n indeterminate amount at the time
w h e n an engagement is undertaken, are not regarded as con
tingent fees w i t h i n the meaning o f this rule.

Human nature being what it is, the accountant should be on
guard lest his independence of judgment be impaired by the
hope of immediate, substantial financial gain. The accounting
profession encourages its members to avoid positions in which
their independent judgment might be so impaired; or where
the public might reasonably believe their judgment was im
properly influenced. This purpose underlies Rule 9, which
prohibits members of the Institute from accepting contingent
fees, except in tax practice.
A n investment banker, having agreed to underwrite and
market an issue of securities, called in a certified public
accountant to audit the accounts of the issuing company and
"certify" the financial statements to be incorporated in the
prospectus. Since the issue was of a speculative character, and
the success of the marketing operation somewhat doubtful,
the banker suggested that the accountant's fee be a percentage
of the underwriter's commission. If all went well, the account[24]
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ant's compensation would be far greater than his usual fee for
the work required. If the securities did not sell well, the
accountant would have to be content with a very small fee. It
seemed reasonable to the banker, accustomed to risking his
money, that the accountant should be willing to share the risk
of the venture, to the relatively minor extent of a professional
fee, when there was a reasonable prospect of handsome
reward.
The certified public accountant cannot properly accept
such a proposal. Suppose in his audit he discovered conditions
in the issuing company, which if disclosed in the financial
statements would ruin the sale of the securities. H e would
have to disclose them and get no compensation for his work,
or that of his salaried assistants. But, more important, even
if no adverse conditions were revealed by the audit, who would
believe that the accountant had been wholly independent in
his certification of the statements in the prospectus if it were
known that he stood to gain much by a favorable showing and
to lose much by an unfavorable one? The contingent-fee
arrangement would have made him an interested party in the
transaction. H e would have forfeited his independent status,
and therefore his value to prospective investors. Since the
only purpose in retaining him, and publishing his certificate,
would be to facilitate the sale of the securities, by reassuring
prospective investors of the reliability of the financial state
ments, the contingent fee would destroy his usefulness to all
concerned.
There is no difference of opinion in the accounting profes
sion on the impropriety of contingent fees for audit work
resulting in expression of an opinion on the fairness of finan
cial statements. It is well established. N o violation of this
precept has been reported for many years.
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The only exception to the rule is tax work. There has been
much debate about this exception, but the view prevailed that
it was necessary and proper. The reasoning which supports
this view is, briefly, that in preparing a tax return, or assisting
a taxpayer in preparing data to establish a claim for refund
or contest an additional assessment, the accountant is not in
the status of an independent auditor, expressing an opinion on
which third parties may rely. H e is, rather, an expert in tax
accounting, helping the taxpayer determine precisely what his
taxable income is. The government does not rely on the
accountant's findings but makes whatever investigations it con
siders necessary before reaching its own conclusions. There
is, therefore, no question here, it is argued, of exposure to
temptation or of jeopardizing public confidence in the account
ant's independence. T h e accountant will, of course, tell the
truth, or forfeit his right to practice before the taxing authori
ties. But the question whether his judgment may be swayed
by his own financial interest in winning the case is not of sig
nificance here, because it is not the accountant's judgment, or
"findings," but the "findings" of the government agents, or
the courts, which shall finally determine the amount of income
to be taxed.
The traditional justification for contingent fees is that they
permit citizens who otherwise could not afford it to obtain
professional assistance. A taxpayer, for example, might not
be able to pay accounting and legal fees to prosecute what he
considered a just claim for refund, or to contest what he con
sidered an unjust assessment, unless he won the refund or was
saved from paying the additional tax. Therefore, it is not
considered improper for both certified public accountants and
lawyers, if they are willing to risk their time and effort, to
assist taxpayers with the understanding that their compensa[26]

Contingent

Fees

tion will be a specified portion of the amount recovered or
saved.
Both the canons of professional ethics of the American Bar
Association and the rules of practice before the United States
Treasury Department permit contingent fees so long as they
are reasonable in amount and are disclosed.
Canon N o . 13 of the Bar Association's code is as follows:
"A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."

Section 2 (y) of Circular N o . 230 (revised), issued by the
committee on practice of the United States Treasury Depart
ment, which states the rules governing admission to practice
before the Department and the causes for disbarment, reads
as follows:
"Sec. 2. Rules and regulations relating to practice. . . .
"(y) No enrolled person shall exact from his client a manifestly un
reasonable fee, whether contingent or otherwise, in any matter before
the Treasury Department. The reasonableness of a fee in any case is
within limits a matter of judgment and depends upon all the facts and
circumstances thereof, including the complexity and difficulty of the
case, the amount of time and labor required for its proper preparation
and presentation, the amount involved, and the professional standing
and experience of the attorney or agent.
"A wholly contingent fee agreement shall not be entered into with
a client by an enrolled person unless the financial status of the client
is such that he would otherwise be unable to obtain the services of an
attorney or agent. Partially contingent fee agreements are permissible
where provision is made for the payment of a minimum fee, substantial
in relation to the possible maximum fee, which minimum fee is to be
paid and retained irrespective of the outcome of the proceeding. Such
minimum fee need not be paid in advance, if provision for its payment
is made irrespective of the outcome of the case. The payment of or
agreement to pay a nominal minimum fee will not satisfy the require
ments of this subsection.

[27]

Professional

Ethics

of Public

Accounting

"Whenever an enrolled attorney or agent shall enter into a contract
to represent a client before the Treasury Department on a wholly or
partially contingent basis, he shall file with the committee a signed state
ment to that effect, containing the terms of the contract as they relate
to compensation.
"When a power of attorney is filed with the Treasury Department
it shall be the duty of the attorney or agent filing the same to file there
with a statement as follows:
"(Place)
"(Date)
(have
)
"This is to certify that I (have not) entered into a contingent or
partially contingent fee agreement for the representation before the De
partment of
in the matter of
under the terms of a power of attorney filed with the Treasury De
partment on .
, and (in case a contingent or
partially contingent fee agreement has been made) that a report of such
(has
)
fee agreement (has not) been made to the Committee on Practice.
"This requirement shall not be applicable to powers of attorney
wherein the authority granted is limited to the filing of tax or informa
tion returns."

These two rules seem to say that practitioners subject to
them may serve clients on a contingent-fee basis, but they
may not exploit a client by claiming an exorbitant fee, regard
less of the outcome of the case, and the determination as to
what is reasonable should be subject to review by a court or
other official authority.
These precedents provided powerful support for those who
contended successfully that the prohibition against acceptance
of contingent fees by members of the American Institute of
Accountants should not apply to fees for tax practice. N o one
has suggested that Rule 9 should be relaxed any further than
this. Outside the field of taxes it is generally accepted that
[28]
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contingent fees for public accountants would be wholly
improper.
There has been some confusion, however, as to just what
a contingent fee is. Every fee is contingent, in a sense, upon
the client's willingness and ability to pay it, and its amount
may vary according to the extent of the work which it is found
necessary to do. The prohibition against contingent fees is
by no means intended to require that all fees be stipulated in
advance of performance. N o r is it suggested that a public
accountant may not properly work for nothing, if he chooses
to accommodate a friend who cannot afford to pay any fee.
Rule 9 says, "Fees to be fixed by courts or other public
authorities, which are therefore of an. indeterminate amount
at the time when an engagement is undertaken, are not re
garded as contingent fees within the meaning of this rule."
In bankruptcy cases, for example, the courts must approve all
fees for professional services rendered. In undertaking to
render such service the accountant may intend to charge for
his work at his regular rates, but his compensation will be
contingent on a court's approval. Yet this would not be a con
tingent fee within the meaning of Rule 9.
Nor is the rule intended to mean that accountants' fees must
always be based on inflexible per diem rates. In deciding what
to charge for his work he may properly consider such factors
as the following (which, by the way, are all specifically recog
nized, among others, as legitimate in Canon N o . 12 of the
canons of professional ethics of the American Bar Associa
t i o n ) : the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite properly to
perform the engagement; the customary charges by certified
public accountants for similar services; the amounts involved
in the transactions to which the accountant's work relates, and
[29]
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the extent of benefit to the client resulting from the account
ant's services; the character of the employment, whether
casual or for an established and constant client.
Since it is entirely proper that a fee may be determined
after the work is completed, and the benefits to the client may
be a factor in fixing its amount, just where is the line of
demarcation between contingent fees that are prohibited and
the fees that are above criticism? The test to apply is whether,
by prearrangement, the accountant has what amounts to a
financial interest in a venture of his client, in that the account
ant may receive an exceptional financial reward, contingent
upon the success of the venture. This kind of prearrangement
is improper because it may influence the accountant's judgment
(or "findings"), or subject him to the suspicion that his inde
pendence has been impaired.
INTERPRETATION
F o l l o w i n g is a summary of a recent opinion o f the A m e r i c a n Institute of
Accountants committee on professional ethics i n response to a request for i n 
terpretation of Rule 9 on contingent fees:
Contingent
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A member is engaged by certain clients as a consultant and receives
a minimum fee and a percentage of the profits of the business for a
stipulated period of time, but the determination of profits is made by
another certified public accountant. The member asks whether these
arrangements violate Rule 9. Fees for consulting services not involving
an opinion as tofinancialstatements might be based on a percentage of
net profits without violating Rule 9, but the question of violation would
depend on the circumstances, including the nature of the consulting ser
vices rendered, extent to which third parties may be informed or in
fluenced as a result of the service, the precise nature of the fee arrange
ment, and the reasonableness of the amount of the fee.

[30}
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Financial Interest in Client's Affairs
Rule 13. A member or an associate shall not express his
opinion on financial statements of any enterprise financed in
whole or in part by public distribution of securities, if he
owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest in the
enterprise which is substantial either in relation to its capital
or to his own personal fortune, or if a member of his im
mediate family owns or is committed to acquire a substan
tial interest in the enterprise. A member or an associate shall
not express his opinion on financial statements which are
used as a basis of credit if he owns or is committed to ac
quire a financial interest in the enterprise which is substantial
either in relation to its capital or to his own personal for
tune, or if a member of his immediate family owns or is
committed to acquire a substantial interest in the enterprise,
unless in his report he discloses such interest.
M o s t members of the profession recognize that it would
be incongruous for them to own any substantial amount o f the
shares or bonds of corporations of which they had been
appointed "independent auditors." Their objectivity as audi
tors would be in question if they owned securities, the market
price of which might be elevated or depressed by publication
of the financial statements which they themselves certified. It
has been the traditional policy of some accounting firms to
forbid partners to own any securities of client companies. But
some accountants have insisted that it was absurd to suppose
that casual investment in the stock of listed corporations which
happened to be their clients could have any influence on their
[31]
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professional attitude. In rare cases would an accountant's
investment in a large public company be enough to give him
any influence in the management. A n d very seldom would an
accountant be found who put so many of his eggs in one basket
that a single investment would be a significant proportion of
his personal fortune.
These arguments are plausible, and to the man of integrity
they are convincing when applied to himself. However, as the
profession became increasingly conscious of the importance
of safeguarding its reputation for independence, the contrary
view came to prevail. W h a t the public might think of account
ants was seen to be almost as important as what accountants
actually were. The public could not be expected to be uncritical
of the judgment or objectivity of any accountant, upon learn
ing that he was the owner of a large block of- stock of the
company whose statements he had certified.
A case of this kind actually came before the council of the
Institute in 1934, and as a result the following resolution was
adopted:
"RESOLVED, That no member or associate shall certify the financial
statements of any enterprisefinancedin whole or in part by the public
distribution of securities if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner
of a substantialfinancialinterest in the enterprise or if he is committed
to acquire such an interest."

A similar position is expressed in a rule of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X)
which provides that an accountant shall not be considered inde
pendent (by the Commission) "who is not in fact independent.
. . . F o r example, an accountant will not be considered inde
pendent with respect to any person in whom he has any sub
stantial interest, direct or indirect, or with whom he is, or was
[32]
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during the period of report, connected as a promoter, under
writer, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee."
After further discussion of the subject and consideration of
other cases in which the question was involved, the substance
of the 1934 resolution was elaborated and was incorporated in
the Institute's rules of professional conduct, as Rule 13, in
1942, as quoted at the head of this chapter. The language of
this rule deserves analysis.
It will be noted that the phrase "express his opinion on"
has again been substituted for "certify," for the reasons men
tioned on page 19 of this book.
The phrase "actual or beneficial owner" in the 1934 resolu
tion has been replaced by the longer and more explicit provi
sion, " i f he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest
in the enterprise . . . or if a member of his immediate family
owns or is committed to acquire a substantial interest. . . ."
The question has arisen as to what persons might be consid
ered as members of a man's "immediate family." The answer,
for purposes of this rule, depends on the circumstances. A n
accountant's nephew, living with his uncle and sharing the
expenses of the home, should be regarded as a member of the
accountant's "immediate family," whereas the accountant's
married daughter, adequately supported by her husband and
not residing with her father, might not be regarded as a mem
ber of the accountant's immediate family. The purpose of this
provision is to discourage transfer of stock ownership to some
one so close to the accountant that he might reasonably be
suspected of enjoying a continuation of the benefits of owner
ship.
The clause, "or is committed to acquire" a substantial inter
est, needs no explanation. It, too, plainly warns against at
tempts to evade the rule.
[33]
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A large question which arises in the application of this rule
is, W h a t is "substantial"? In relation to the capital of the
enterprise, an interest large enough, even in combination with
other interests, to influence the policy or management of the
company, would, of course, be substantial. Possession of so
large an interest would put an accountant in the position,
potentially at least, of auditing transactions over which he had
a measure of control—auditing his own business. Clearly he
would not be regarded as independent in such circumstances.
In relation to his own personal fortune, an interest so large
that in the opinion of his peers its loss would be a severe
deprivation would probably be considered "substantial."
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in dealing with
the problem of determining what is substantial, has used a
test of one per cent in considering whether a financial interest
is substantial in relation to the accountant's personal fortune
under Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X. W h a t would be held to
be substantial in relation to the total capital of the enterprise
remains to be determined in each individual case.
Even with this precedent before it, however, the council
of the Institute was unwilling to be quite so specific. The coun
cil has consistently shown an anxiety to avoid the sin of per
fectionism. Recognizing that one per cent might be "substan
tial" in some cases, but wholly insignificant in others, it pre
ferred to express its general policy and then consider specific
complaints in the light of all the circumstances, rather than
expose members of the Institute to indignity or censure on
purely technical grounds.
A n effort to preserve a balance between the rights and the
dignity of the individual accountant and the interests of the
public and the profession as a whole is also indicated by the
distinction in Rule 13 between "financial statements of any
[34]
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enterprise financed in whole or in part by public distribution
of securities" and "financial statements which are used as a
basis of credit." In the first instance the rule says the member
may not own a substantial financial interest. In the second
instance it says he must disclose his financial interest, if any,
in his report. This shows an effort to distinguish between the
"public company," in which large numbers of stockholders
are largely dependent on the published financial statements
for information on the management of the company's affairs;
and the "close corporation," in which a small number of stock
holders, who usually themselves constitute the management
and the board of directors, effectively control the operations
of the enterprise and may be presumed to know all about its
affairs. Such companies do not commonly publish financial
statements for the information of the public, and the only
outsiders who have a legitimate interest in its financial posi
tion or operations are banks from which it borrows money,
or others who have granted it credit. Here, the council of
the Institute holds, the accountant is not forbidden to own
some stock, if he discloses the facts in each of his reports so
that credit grantors, as well as all the owners of the company,
will be informed of his financial interest.
This distinction between public and closely held companies
is of particular interest because it hints that in its heart the
council does not believe the possession of a financial interest
in a company would actually influence a certified public account
ant in the capacity of auditor to veer from the course pointed
by his best judgment. If the council did believe this it would
unequivocally forbid stock ownership in any client company.
The rule as a whole, then, seems mainly intended to avoid
the "appearance of evil," that is, to remove grounds for sus
picion or criticism on the part of the public.
[35]
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Regardless of the latitude which the rule permits in its
application to closely held companies, an accountant is prob
ably wise if he avoids any financial interest in a company of
which he is auditor. Even in small companies there are some
times conflicts among stockholders, and the accountant who
was himself a stockholder might find his reports challenged
on the ground that they could not be impartial. Again, even
though he disclosed his own financial interest, he would be in
an embarrassing position if a credit grantor questioned his
report. In the event of litigation bringing the accountant into
court, he would probably be much more comfortable there if
no one could accuse him of carrying water on both shoulders.
Logic supports the contention that the independent auditor
should be free of financial interest in any client's enterprise.
If he chooses to invest in a client company which looks good
to him, let him retire as auditor and recommend a fellow
practitioner for this post. T h i s will not only strengthen his
independence in the eyes of the world, but will probably win
for him a life-long friend.
OTHER IMPROPER FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
T h e council of the American Institute of Accountants, sit
ting as a trial board in 1941, expressed the view that all pub
lic accountants should avoid any financial relationship with
officers or employees of client corporations. This expression
was prompted by consideration of a complaint in which a
member employed by a public accounting firm was alleged to
have furnished to a third party information as to the value
of securities issued by client companies. In view of the lack of
evidence that the respondent had participated in any profits
from transactions in securities as a result of the information
he had given, no penalty was imposed upon him, but the dis[36]
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cussion which followed resulted in the council's resolution to
publish a warning against any financial relationships with
clients.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has criticized
accountants for lending money to their clients, even though
the amounts were not relatively substantial and the clients
were also personal friends. The existence of such loans from
accountant to client has been cited among other evidence
alleged to indicate lack of independence on the part of the
accountant.
The Institute's committee on professional ethics has ex
pressed the opinion that Rule 13 applies to a financial interest
in a loan, whether or not evidenced by a note, as well as to
ownership of capital stock, provided the financial interest rep
resented by the loan is substantial either in relation to the
capital of the enterprise or the personal fortune of the
accountant.
INTERPRETATIONS
F o l l o w i n g are summaries of recent opinions b y the A m e r i c a n Institute o f
Accountants committee on professional ethics on questions related to financial
interests i n clients:
Financial

Interest

The question is asked, what percentage of stock is considered a sub
stantial financial interest in interpreting Rule 13, and whether this rule
refers to non-voting preferred as well as common stock. Rule 13 covers
common and preferred stock, voting and non-voting, as well as bonds
and any other type of financial interest. There is no fixed percentage
which is considered as representing a substantial financial interest. What
is substantial will be determined in the light of all the circumstances,
including cost, value, and relationship to the total stock of the company
and to the personal fortune of the holder. The chief purpose of the
word "substantial" is to indicate the spirit of the rule and to prevent
its being applied literally to trivial situations. In any case, an accountant
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would be well advised to have no financial interest in an enterprise
which he is auditing.

With reference to the case of a close corporation as covered in Rule 13,
the question has been raised as to the manner in which disclosure is to
be made; whether, specifically, a list of stockholders, showing names
and amount of stock owned, included as part of the auditor's report,
would constitute compliance with the rule. The committee does not
believe a list of stockholders' names, including name of the auditor,
would constitute compliance; but suggests a statement in the account
ant's report or certificate, such as the following:
"In accordance with the requirements of the American Institute of
Accountants, the undersigned states that he (members of his family,
members of his firm, etc., etc.) has a substantial financial interest in
the Company."
A member audits a certain management concern which has recently
acquired the management of a building in which he has 25 shares of
stock. The audit automatically comes to him. He raises the question
whether it is necessary for him to dispose of his small holdings. The
committee's opinion is that if he wishes to place himself in the proper
independent relationship which an auditor should bear to his client, he
will dispose of his holdings in this building.
Family

Interest

The question is asked whether a member of an accountant's family
may properly hold stock in a company of which he is the auditor. It
has been generally agreed that independent auditors should not have a
financial interest in client companies. The SEC has ruled that the hold
ing of such stock by members of an accountant's immediate family im
pairs his independence as auditor. It is the belief of the committee on
professional ethics that such stockholdings are undesirable.
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CHAPTER 5

Auditor as Director
The Institute's rules of professional conduct contain no ref
erence to simultaneous service as auditor and director of a
corporation, but the literature of the profession contains
abundant evidence of the prevailing belief that this is a rela
tionship to be avoided generally. T h e following editorial
comment published in The Journal of Accountancy,
while
wholly unofficial, indicates the views of some accountants who
have considered this subject:
"At the meeting of council of the American Institute of Accountants
in May there was discussion of the propriety or impropriety of simul
taneous service as director and independent auditor of a nonprofit in
stitution. Reference was made to an editorial in The Journal of Ac
countancy for April, 1941, in which it was suggested that while no
member of the Institute is forbidden to act in both capacities the risks
involved make it unwise to do so. Some of the speakers at the council
meeting objected to anything in the nature of a prohibition against such
simultaneous service in two capacities, particularly in the case of civic
organizations such as community funds, chambers of commerce, and sim
ilar enterprises in which certified public accountants are frequently asked
to take part both as directors or trustees and in their professional ca
pacity. Other speakers expressed the opinion that in some cases an ac
countant should not be criticized for occupying both positions, but that
in other circumstances the course of wisdom might be to decline one
position or the other.
"The whole question must be considered not only from the viewpoint
of the auditor himself, but also from the viewpoint of the organization
and of the public from whom financial support may be expected. Would
contributors to or members of such an organization doubt the disin
terestedness of the auditor if he were also a member of the board? The
answer depends on the circumstances; probably in part on the extent
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to which the directors actually perform administrative duties. As an ex
treme example, it would surely be in poor taste for the auditor to serve
also as treasurer. At the other extreme, if the directors were remote
from administrative functions, serving principally in a supervisory ca
pacity, the possibility of criticism of one who was both auditor and
director would be minimized.
"Clearly in nonprofit enterprises the problem is entirely different from
that in a business corporation, where it is generally recognized that the
independent auditor should not be a director. In many charitable or
civic organizations a certified public accountant may, with the knowl
edge of a 1 concerned, be helpful both as a member of the board of
directors and as auditor of the accounts, but in any case he should be
conscious of additional responsibility when he serves in both positions."

Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X of the Securities and Exchange
Commission specifically provides that an accountant will not
be considered independent, in relation to a corporation filing
financial statements he has certified, if he is a director, pro
moter, underwriter, voting trustee, officer, or employee of
the corporation.
There is no doubt that this is a safe rule. A director is in
a position to influence the management of a company. T h e
auditor who was also a director would profess to express an
objective and impartial professional opinion of transactions
which he had already approved or authorized in another
capacity. This is an anomalous position, and in public com
panies surely it should be avoided.
The only permissible exceptions may be in the case of non
profit organizations, or in closely held companies where the
accountant is acting in the dual capacities of director and
auditor as representative of a particular interest, such as a
bank which is a creditor of the corporation. In the latter
instance he is hardly an "independent" auditor, but is serving
rather as special representative, and it may be questioned
whether he should certify financial statements which are to be
[40]
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submitted to others than those he represents, at least without
clearly disclosing his own position.
The following rule governing auditor-director relations is
quoted from the rules of professional conduct of the N e w
York State Society of Certified Public Accountants:
"A member shall not express his opinion on financial statements of
an enterprise financed in whole or in part by a public distribution of
securities, or on financial statements for use as a basis of credit, if he,
a partner in his firm, or a member of his immediate family owns or is
committed to acquire a substantial interest in the enterprise, or if he
or a partner in his firm is an employee or director of the enterprise,
unless he discloses such interest, employment or directorship in his
report."
INTERPRETATIONS
F o l l o w i n g are summaries of recent opinions by the A m e r i c a n Institute of
Accountants committee on professional ethics on questions related to simultane
ous service as auditor and director, employee, or voting trustee:
Auditor-Director
While the rules of professional conduct do not specifically forbid
simultaneous service as auditor and director so long as the auditor holds
no substantial financial interest in the corporate client, the committee
is unanimous in its belief that it is unwise for an independent auditor
to serve also as a member of the board of directors of the corporate
client. The rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission do pro
vide that an auditor will not be considered independent if he is an officer
or director of a corporate client. Joint service as auditor and director
of a corporation would be objectionable unless the facts were clearly
displayed in the accountant's report. Anyone who serves in that dual
capacity is in a vulnerable position.

A client, owner and manager of a business school, has decided to
place in charge of the school an employee who has been associated with
him for some years as assistant manager, while he is in the Army. He
has requested a member of the Institute to act as a director of the cor
poration, and also wishes him to continue in the capacity of auditor. The
question is raised whether in the circumstances there would be any vio-
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lation of the rules of ethical practice. The committee appreciates that
there may be situations where the stock of a company may be held by
one or two persons and no bank credit is sought. In such a case little
or no objection might be raised if the auditor also acted in the capacity
of director or officer of the corporation involved. The purpose of hav
ing the auditor act as director or officer is to exercise control over the
funds of the company. Any other purpose could be exercised by the audi
tor without the necessity of occupying an official position. The com
mittee feels that the member should point out to his client the incon
sistency of acting as auditor and at the same time occupying the dual
position of officer or director. The committee believes that the member
should suggest to the client that he select persons in whom he has con
fidence for his board and for such offices as are required to be filled in
his absence, and make definite arrangements with the member as to the
extent to which he shall supervise and control the affairs of the com
pany. It is the committee's belief that joint service as auditor and direc
tor should be discouraged, on the grounds that an accountant cannot
be entirely independent if, at the same time that he is auditing the books,
he is a member of the official family whose books are being audited.

A corporation is owned by a father and son. The father is physically
disabled and the son is being drafted into the Army. They have pro
posed that the auditor serve on the executive board to carry on or liqui
date the firm's business. If liquidation were decided upon financial
statements might not be certified for public consumption, and presum
ably there would be no applications for credit; therefore, it would be
of little practical significance to anyone if the accountant were both a
member of the executive board and auditor, but he should disclose in
any certificate or report the fact that he was a member of the execu
tive board. It would be a better arrangement if he continued as auditor
and sat with the board as technical advisor without being a member of
it or having any vote in its decisions; or he might accept membership
on the board for compensation and arrange to have any necessary audit
performed by some other firm.

A firm of certified public accountants is regularly engaged as ac
countants and auditors for a client, the report being issued under the
firm name but the actual audit and responsibility and preparation of
the report being in charge of Partner A . The report does not contain
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an opinion paragraph. The report is used solely for the information
of the client's management and stockholders, the latter consisting of
three individuals. Partner B has been a director of the client concern
and recently was made assistant general manager at substantially in
creased compensation so as to enable him to take a much closer interest
in the client's affairs and management. In his capacity, Partner B was
in effect representing the principal stockholder who was ill and not able
to supervise and protect his interest. The question is raised whether
the firm of CPA's can be deemed independent. It is the opinion of
the committee that the accounting firm would be wise not to continue
in the capacity of auditor for the concern, but since the stock is held
by only three stockholders, there does not seem to be any impropriety
in the firm's accepting appointment as auditors so long as all the stock
holders desire the appointment, and the audit reports rendered by the
firm clearly disclose the positions held in the concern by Partner B.
Auditor

of Fraternal

Organization

An accountant who is a member of a fraternal or social organization
may act as independent auditor of such association unless peculiar cir
cumstances would interfere with his independence.
Auditor-Voting

Trustee

A certified public accountant should not serve simultaneously as vot
ing trustee and independent auditor unless the peculiar terms of his
appointment and his duties as trustee clearly remove the possibility of
conflict with his duty as independent auditor.
Bookkeeper-Auditor
The question is asked whether an accountant may properly serve simul
taneously as bookkeeper and independent auditor of a corporation. It
is generally agreed that in the case of a corporation whose securities
are widely distributed, certainly in the case of a lisited corporation, no
one who is an officer or employee of the company can properly serve as
"independent" auditor. The committee believes that even in the case
of smaller, closely held corporations, the person continually making en
tries in the books, or directly supervising and controlling the bookkeep
ing, cannot consistently be "independent" auditor of the accounts for
which he is himself responsible. There is an important distinction,
however, between such full responsibility for the bookkeeping and the
general accounting advice and service which many certified public ac-
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countants quite properly render to clients while also serving as inde
pendent auditors. The technical and more or less mechanical task of
writing up books from data submitted by a client may be performed
by a certified public accountant without necessarily impairing his inde
pendence as auditor. Judgment must be applied to the circumstances
of each case.
Employment

by Affiliated

Company

A certified public accountant is employed by a company as assistant
auditor. The company owns stock in another company and an officer
and director of the first company hold the same positions in the second
company. The accountant as part of his regular duties conducts pe
riodic audits of the second company. He is now asked to certify the
financial statements of the second company. The question is asked
whether there is any objection to this procedure. In the circumstances
outlined, it is doubtful whether the accountant could be considered
"independent" with respect to the financial statements of the second
company. The financial interest of the first company in the second com
pany, by which he is employed, would raise questions as to the ac
countant's independence. If he should decide to sign the report, dis
closure should be made of the factors which adversely affect his
independent status.
Employee-Auditor
It is proposed that a member employed by a cooperative (a non
profit organization rendering various types of service to its members, all
of whom are stockholders) undertake to audit the records of its mem
bers and certify statements of such members which will be used occa
sionally for credit purposes. It may be proposed that the member in
the same status audits the books of his employer, the cooperative, and
certify its statement, which will almost certainly be used only for in
ternal purposes. The question is asked whether the arrangement is
proper. It is the general opinion that if as a professional practicing
certified public accountant the member were engaged on a fee basis to
audit the accounts of the cooperative and the accounts of its members,
he might properly certify thefinancialstatements. However, as an em
ployee of the cooperative on a salary basis, the committee believes it
would be improper and inconsistent for him to do so, since he could not
be considered an independent public accountant. There would be no
objection to his auditing the accounts of the members in the manner
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in which internal auditors of cooperatives perform such functions, and
he could make reports based upon that examination, but he should not
certify them as an independent professional practitioner, and should
make it clear in his reports that he was acting as an officer or employee
of the cooperative.
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CHAPTER 6

Occupations Incompatible with
Public Accounting
Rule 4. A member or an associate shall not engage in
any business or occupation conjointly with that of a public
accountant, which is incompatible or inconsistent therewith.
The three rules which most clearly and directly buttress
the independence of the certified public accountant have al
ready been described, but there are others which in large part
were designed for the same purpose. One of these is Rule 4 .
This rule is of ancient lineage—ancient, that is, in the his
tory of a profession which has less than a century of organ
ized activity behind it.
The Royal Charter of the Institute of Chartered Account
ants in England and Wales, dated M a y 11, 1880, contains
a provision that no member shall follow any business or pro
fession other than that of a public accountant or some busi
ness which in the opinion of the council is "incident thereto
or consistent therewith." Undoubtedly the draftsmen of the
American Institute of Accountants earliest rules adapted this
provision.
It is a sound rule, although apparently it was of far greater
importance in the early days of the profession than at present.
The anonymous author of The Etiquette of the Accountancy
Profession
(Gee & Co., London, 1927), says that prior to
1880 many persons were in practice as public accountants who
followed other callings which by no stretch of the imagination
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could be regarded as in any way connected with public account
ing. Among these callings it appears that those of auctioneer
and stockbroker were particularly prevalent! This seems ridic
ulous today, but it throws light on the conditions under which
the accounting profession gained its foothold in the economic
world.
Quite probably many of the early accountants had at first
earned a living in some commercial or financial activity which
brought them an acquaintance with, and an interest in, ac
counts. In many cases, no doubt, this interest developed into
a major purpose, and the business which had been the main
source of livelihood became of secondary importance. The
same circumstances may have occurred in the United States,
although probably to a less extent, since many of the organ
izers of the profession here had been trained and qualified
in England, and were already successful public accountants.
A t any rate, while Rule 4 has rarely been invoked in the
past twenty-five years, it is a necessary part of the pattern of
professional conduct of certified public accountants. The pro
fession could not tolerate participation by any of its members
in another vocation of a kind that would cast doubt on their
independence as public accountants. The public might well
hesitate to accept the opinions of accountants as wholly im
partial and objective if practitioners of the profession were
widely known to engage simultaneously in such businesses as
stockbrokerage or investment banking.
One can easily see a relationship here to the philosophy
which supports the rules prohibiting contingent fees and finan
cial interest in client corporations, and the unwritten precept
against simultaneous service as auditor and director of a cor
poration. If it would impair independence to have a financial
interest in the outcome of an underwriting of securities, for
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example, it would be no less incongrous to act as the under
writer or the salesman!
A secondary objective of Rule 4 was undoubtedly to pro
tect the dignity of the young accounting profession. Activity
as a stockbroker might not impair one's independence as an
accountant, but it certainly would not enhance the public
respect for accounting.
INTERPRETATIONS
Following is a summary o f opinions expressed by committees on professional
ethics o f the A m e r i c a n Institute of Accountants i n response to inquiries on
Rule 4:

Activity

Incompatible

with Public

Accounting

The question has been raised whether it would be in contravention of
the rules of professional conduct of the Institute for a member, while in
practice as a professional accountant, to be a limited partner of a brok
erage firm engaged in the purchase and sale of securities and commod
ities to the public on a commission basis. It is the opinion of the com
mittee that while not necessarily in violation of the Institute's rules, an
association of this kind would be inconsistent with standards of inde
pendence and not in the best interests of the profession.
Business Incompatible

with Accounting

Practice

A member desires to enter into a business which will be operated so
as not to interfere with his public accounting practice. This business
will be to devise and sell through the mails specialized accounting forms
for small businesses. The new business will be operated under a trade
name and the member's name will not appear on the letterhead or any
other advertising used, and it is his present intention that his name will
not be used in any of the company's correspondence. It is not his in
tention to sell these forms to any of his clients nor to use the sale of
these forms to obtain new clients. The question is asked whether any
rule of the Institute would prohibit his entering into this enterprise.
It is our belief that an independent accountant should not engage in
the activity outlined because there is danger of violating Rule 4. It is
the opinion of the committee that the proposed activity could not be con
ducted without violating Rule 15, inasmuch as the proposed enterprise
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would indulge in advertising and solicitation in a manner forbidden by
the rules of the Institute. The fact that the member's name would not
appear in any form in connection with the enterprise, and the anonymity
with which he proposes to cloak the venture, seems to constitute, if any
thing, a greater offense against the Institute's rules than open violation
thereof.
Investment Dealer

or Security

Salesman

Rule 4 was intended to cover activities in which it might be held that
a public accountant could not appropriately engage simultaneously with
the conduct of professional accounting practice. For example, it might
be held that a public accountant should not at the same time be an in
vestment dealer, or security salesman.
Part-Tune

Practice

There would be no objection to part-time public accounting practice
by a member employed by a business corporation, provided there was
nothing in such employment incompatible with the practice of account
ing within the meaning of Rule 4, and provided further that the mem
ber did not act as independent public accountant for the private employer.
Client in Illegal

Business

There is no specific rule of conduct which would apply to the ques
tion whether an accountant auditing the books and preparing the tax
returns for illegal businesses would be considered an ethical practi
tioner, but in the opinion of the committee association with illegal bus
inesses might bring an accountant under disciplinary proceedings under
Rule 4 of the rules of professional conduct of the Institute; also, such
service might lead to situations which would justify charges under Ar
ticle V of the by-laws of the Institute, which deals with acts "dis
creditable to the profession."
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CHAPTER 7

Occupations Followed Simultaneously
with Practice of Public Accounting
Rule 15. A member or an associate of the American In
stitute of Accountants engaged simultaneously in the prac
tice of public accounting and in another occupation must in
both capacities observe the by-laws and rules of professional
conduct of the Institute.

Rule 4, it must be noted, does not say that no other busi
ness or occupation may be followed conjointly with that of a
public accountant, but only incompatible or inconsistent occu
pations. N o catalogue of occupations permissible or forbid
den under this rule is available. The committee on professional
ethics and the council of the Institute must make the decisions
in the light of the circumstances when questions arise.
Occupations which have been followed, in conjunction with
public accounting, by a number of Institute members are those
of lawyer and management engineer.
A fairly large number of certified public accountants are
also members of the bar, and in tax work particularly there
is a close relation between the law and accounting. Both certi
fied public accountants and lawyers are admitted to practice
before the Treasury Department and the United States T a x
Court. It is not surprising that some men should become
qualified in both professions and practice them simultaneously.
What might be interpreted as disapproval of combining law
practice with any other occupation, however, appears in the
following provision of Canon 33 of the canons of professional
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ethics of the American B a r Association: "Partnerships be
tween lawyers and members of other professions or non
professional persons should not be formed or permitted where
any part of the partnership's employment consists of the
practice of law." A n interpretation of this canon referring
specifically to accountants appears in the following opinion of
the American Bar Association's committee on ethics:
"OPINION N O . 269
(June 21, 1945)
"Partnerships—Division of Fees—A partnership between a lawyer and
a layman accountant to specialize in income-tax work and related
accounting is permissible only if the lawyer ceases entirely to hold
himself out as such and confines his activities strictly to such as are
open to lay accountants.
Canons involved: 33, 34, 3 5 , 47
Opinion 257
"The committee is asked to express its opinion on the following
questions:
"A is an attorney-at-law and a certified public accountant. Can he be
employed by an accounting firm which specializes in income-tax work
performing such work which necessarily includes accounting and law
work in the preparation of income-tax returns and the presentation of
cases before the U . S. Treasury Department? A l l income-tax cases
have mixed questions of accounting and law in so far as income taxes
(law) are concerned. Can A be a member of an accounting firm as a
partner?
"B is an attorney-at-law, with knowledge of accounting. Can he be
employed by an accounting firm of certified public accountants and per
form the work outlined in the above question? Can such an attorney-atlaw appear before the U . S. Tax Court representing a client of such
certified public accountant assuming (a) he is not a certified public
accountant (b) he is a certified public accountant and is admitted to
practice before the Tax Court?
"The opinion of the committee was stated by M r . Jackson, Messrs.
Brand, Drinker, Hostetler, Houghton, Powell and Shackleford con
curring.
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"This committee has no jurisdiction to deal with questions of law or
unauthorized practice. Accordingly, our opinion is limited to the prob
lems of ethics involved in the above questions.
"In opinion 257 we held that a lawyer may enter into partnership
with a lay patent agent licensed by the United States Patent Office if
the partnership activities are limited to such as are permitted laymen
under Patent Office rules. We said there:
"We have held that certain activities constitute the practice of the
law when engaged in by a lawyer despite the fact that those activities
may lawfully be engaged in by one not a lawyer. A lawyer may properly
enter into partnership with a layman if the activities of the partnership
and of the lawyer member are confined to those which may be carried
on by the layman, provided the lawyer renounces or refrains from hold
ing himself out as a lawyer and from carrying on any activities which
may not properly be carried on by the layman (see Opinion No. 2 3 9 ) .
Thus, if a lawyer goes into a partnership conducting an accounting or a
collection business, he can no longer with propriety continue to hold
himself out as a lawyer or continue to practice law. The accounting
and collection business are fields open to laymen, and this is so even if
these activities involve necessarily a limited degree of legal knowledge.
"We desire to emphasize that the lawyer in the instant case and in
like lay partnerships must completely disassociate himself from any prac
tice or holding out that would indicate that he is a member of the bar
or in any way engaged in practice as a lawyer. If, for example, he pre
pares a tax claim, his employer must understand that he is not acting
as a member of the bar, but solely as an accountant. In our opinion
Canon 33 does not apply to a member of the bar who restricts his ac
tivities as above indicated, but only to one who holds himself out as a
lawyer and at the same time engages in a type of activity open to laymen
which serves as a natural feeder to his law practice.
"With respect to listing in a law list we held in opinion 257 that an
asterisk opposite the name of the lawyer member of such a partnership
could not be used to indicate that he had been admitted to practice, and
that we re-affirm."

Management engineering and public accounting also find
a natural meeting place in the field of industrial accounting,
though they may approach it from different directions. There
have been fairly numerous instances in which individuals or
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firms have combined the practice of accounting or engineering,
and this has not been held improper.
However, a member who does combine another occupation
with the practice of accounting is subject to Rule 15, quoted
at the head of this chapter. This rule, of fairly recent origin,
was recommended by the Institute's committee on professional
ethics after its attention had been called to instances in which
members of the Institute engaged in the practice of public
accounting were also members of management engineering
firms which advertised their services. Advertising is prohibited
by Rule 10 (which will be discussed later). It seemed anom
alous that a member who could not advertise his services as
a public accountant should be permitted to advertise them
as an engineer. Rule 15 was the result.
T o sum up, a professional certified public accountant should
not engage in any other occupation which might compromise
his independence or objectivity as an auditor, nor in any
which by its incongruity would impair the dignity of the
accounting profession. If he does engage in another occupa
tion not incompatible with public accounting, he must observe
the rules of conduct of the accounting profession in both
capacities.
The general tendency is to avoid "mixed practice." Even
accountants who are also members of the bar frequently do
not practice law, or even indicate on their letterheads that
they are qualified to do so. There are so many opportunities
for qualified accountants to render constructive service that
the economic pressure, which may have existed in the early
days, to have a "side line" has disappeared, and there is so
much a good accountant today should know that he is unlikely
to have time or energy to carry on another profession or
business in addition to his accounting practice. The question
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whether it is proper to practice public accounting simultaneously
with another occupation has arisen very infrequently in recent
years.
INTERPRETATION
Following is an opinion expressed by the committee on professional
ethics of the American Institute of Accountants in response to an inquiry:
Practice as Engineer
If a member of the Institute becomes a principal in an industrial man
agement organization, the other members of which are not members of
the Institute, the member is nevertheless subject to the rules of profes
sional conduct of the Institute if he also undertakes accounting prac
tice. Under Rule 15 a member in public accounting practice and
simultaneously engaged in another occupation must in both capacities
abide by the rules of professional conduct of the American Institute of
Accountants.
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CHAPTER 8

Commissions, Brokerage, and Fee
Splitting
Rule 3. Commissions, brokerage or other participation in
the fees or profits of professional work shall not be allowed
directly or indirectly to the laity by a member or an associate.
Commissions, brokerage or other participation in the fees,
charges or profits of work recommended or turned over to
the laity as incident to services for clients shall not be ac
cepted directly or indirectly by a member or an associate.

The last of the five rules which relate directly to protec
tion of the accountant's independence is Rule 3, which forbids
commissions, brokerage, or fee splitting between a member
of the Institute and the "laity," which for this purpose in
cludes anyone who is not a professional public accountant.
The second part of the rule is intended, in part, to keep the
accountant from having a financial interest, over and above
the fee which his client will pay him, in the results of any
engagement, which might cast doubt on his disinterested and
objective view as auditor. F o r example, i f a client company
decides to offer its securities to the public, and the accountant
recommends an investment banker to handle the issue, the
accountant could not properly accept a commission for bring
ing profitable business to the banker. I f he should accept, the
accountant might have to refute the charge that the pecuniary
incentive to hope that the deal would be profitable had affected
his judgment, as auditor, in certifying the financial statements
forming a part of the prospectus. In these circumstances a
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commission would take on some of the characteristics of a
contingent fee and would be undesirable for the same reasons.
Even though a commission would be unlikely actually to in
fluence the auditor's judgment, since he would have much
more to lose than to gain by coloring his certificate, it might
seem to the public, if the facts were known, that the relation
ship between the banker and the accountant was such as to
impair the accountant's independence. A relationship which
cannot stand the light of day is in itself undesirable. A pro
fessional certified public accountant simply cannot afford to
have questions raised about his independence, even questions
which he can answer to his own satisfaction.
Rule 3 has other purposes, in addition to safeguarding the
concept of independence, which will be considered in a follow
ing chapter (see page 69).
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CHAPTER 9

Forecasts
Rule 12. A member or an associate shall not permit his
name to be used in conjunction with an estimate of earn
ings contingent upon future transactions in a manner which
may

lead to the belief that the member or associate vouches

for the accuracy of the forecast.
Every effort has been made by the accounting profession
to invest the accountant's professional opinion—his certificate
—with the authority of a competent and independent expert
who has satisfied himself that financial statements reflecting
past operations fairly present what they purport to present.
In other words, the accountant's certificate has been held out
as something on which "third parties" may safely rely.
It is not considered proper, therefore, for an accountant to
lend his name to forecasts of earnings which might lead pros
pective investors to undue reliance on such statements.
In 1932 the council of the Institute, as a result of consid
eration of the matter by Institute committees, adopted the
following resolution:
W H E R E A S , Estimates of earnings contingent upon future transactions
should always be clearly distinguished from statements of actual earn
ings evidenced by definite records, and
W H E R E A S , An accountant may properly assist a client in estimating
the results of future transactions, so long as no one may be led to be
lieve that the estimates represent certainties,
B E IT RESOLVED, That no public accountant should permit his name
to be used in conjunction with such an estimate in a manner which might
lead anyone to believe that the accountant could vouch for the accuracy
of the forecast; and
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B E IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That violation of this dictum by a mem
ber or an associate of the American Institute of Accountants be con
sidered by the committee on professional ethics as cause for charges un
der the provision of Article V, Section 4(e) of the by-laws, or Rule 2
of the rules of professional conduct of the American Institute of Ac
countants, or both.
In 1941, when the rules of professional conduct were over
hauled as a whole, this precept was incorporated as Rule 12,
as quoted above. The purpose of the rule is entirely plain—
to prevent the public, accustomed to reliance on accountants'
certificates as credible evidence of the fairness of financial
statements, from being misled by the appearance of account
ants' names in conjunction with forecasts based on assumptions
which may prove to be invalid.
The

question is sometimes asked whether this rule would

prevent an accountant from assisting a client in the prepara
tion of a budget, which might be considered a "forecast of
earnings." The answer, of course, is that it is wholly proper
to render such assistance. The accountant does not certify a
budget, since it is inevitable that actual performance will be
different from the estimates. Budgets are not published in a
manner likely to mislead anyone.
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III. T H E INTEREST OF T H E CLIENT
C H A P T E R 10

Confidential Relationship
Rule 16. A member or an associate shall not violate the
confidential relationship between himself and his client.
So far this discussion has centered on the interest of the
public in the work of the professional certified public account
ant in his capacity as auditor.
No less clearly, however, is the certified public accountant
required to recognize and carry out his obligation to his client.
Should the interest of the public and the client be in conflict
in any case, the independent auditor must insist that material
information of significance to either is clearly disclosed in
the financial statements he is requested to certify.
There are many helpful services which professional certified
public accountants render to their clients which are not of any
concern to the general public, such as the installation of
accounting and cost systems, special investigations, consulta
tion and advice on accounting aspects of business problems.
In the undertaking of these services, where there is no expres
sion of professional opinion by which third parties may be
affected, the accountant's duty and responsibility run to the
client alone.
It is obviously desirable that the profession as a whole so
conduct itself that businessmen and others who are or may
become clients of its members shall have confidence in the
competence and trustworthiness of certified public accountants.
It is difficult to practice public accounting without any clients.
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rules of professional conduct, therefore, contain pro

visions to safeguard the interests of clients which, like those
to safeguard the interests of the public, have a dual purpose:
to guide practitioners and to reassure those who may engage
them.
The

relationship between the professional certified public

accountant and his client is essentially confidential. The ac
countant, by the very nature of his work, is admitted to
knowledge of his clients' most private business and financial
affairs. Like the physician, he is often the repository of infor
mation of the most personal nature. Often he is engaged
by competitors in the same line of business, each of whom
would be most interested to know about the affairs of the
other. It would be fatal to his own professional career, and
damaging to the whole profession, if the information en
trusted to him were improperly revealed. It is the accountant's
sacred duty to respect the confidential relationship with his
clients. The man with a loose tongue, the man who can
not keep a secret, should never attempt to practice public
accounting.
The

necessity of discretion will be recognized instinctively

by anyone entering the practice of public accounting. It has
been emphasized again and again in the professional literature,
It is one of the first things that certified public accountants
teach their young assistants. It is not uncommon to have them
sign a "code of secrecy." Many accountants will not even vol
untarily disclose the names of their clients.
For

these reasons it was not even considered necessary

until 1941 to deal with the subject in the Institute's rules of
professional conduct. In that year, however, the committee
on professional ethics suggested that the rules were incom
plete, as a guide to students and to the public, without any
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reference to so basic a concept of professional ethics. T h e
council therefore adopted Rule 16, quoted above.
The only questions requiring interpretation of this precept
arise when a client is engaged i n litigation, or when the
accountant discovers that a client is doing something wrong.
N o t infrequently accountants are asked to testify in law
suits, particularly in cases in which partners or minority stock
holders are suing for a greater share of the profits or for
damages based on malfeasance of directors. T h e accountant
who has served as auditor of the company whose affairs are
under consideration should never testify against his client in
such a matter voluntarily. The information in his possession
was acquired solely because he was engaged as a trusted pro
fessional practitioner and he should not violate the trust. H e
may, however, be required to testify under subpoena, and in
this case he has no choice but to yield to the compulsion of
the law.
Communications between accountant and client are not
privileged under the common law, as are those of physicians,
clergymen, and lawyers. In some states, however, there is a
statutory privilege. The accountancy law of Illinois, for ex
ample, contains the following provision:
"Sec. 27. A public accountant shall not be required by any court to
divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his
confidential capacity as a public accountant." *

The accountancy law of New Mexico contains the follow
ing provision:
"Section 20-112(e). In the courts of the state of New Mexico no cer*A federal district court held that this provision d i d not make privileged any
evidence i n possession of an accountant when he was directed by a v a l i d sum
mons o f the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, o r his agent, to appear a n d
testify. {Eckerling v . Helvering,
U . S. District Court, Northern District o f I l 
linois, Eastern D i v i s i o n , 29 A F T R 1295.)
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tified public accountant or public accountant shall be permitted to dis
close information obtained in the conduct of any examination, audit or
other investigation made in a professional capacity, or which may have
been disclosed to said accountant by a client, without the consent in
writing of such client or his, her, or its successors or legal representatives.
"(f) If a person offer himself as a witness and voluntarily testify
with reference to the communications specified in this act (section), that
is to be deemed a consent to the examination of the person to whom the
communications were made as above provided."*
There is a difference of opinion within the profession as to
whether or not statutory provisions creating privileged com
munications between clients and accountants are desirable. It
is universally agreed that the accountant should not volun
tarily disclose any information in his possession about a client's
affairs, but there is some doubt whether it is in the public
interest to impede the courts in the administration of justice
by preventing them by law from calling accountants as wit
nesses. On the other hand, confidence that what is told an
auditor in his professional capacity will be held inviolate may
result in his obtaining required information freely and thus
make for a better audit. This too is in the public interest.
What applies to oral disclosures by an accountant applies
with equal force to his working papers and other documents in
his possession containing information about a client's affairs.
These papers should be guarded with the utmost diligence and
scrupulously kept from the eyes of outsiders. It has been held
that working papers are the property of the accountant himself†, and not even the client can require their surrender.
Some state laws also contain provisions to this effect.††Work
ing papers may be required to be produced in court by sub*Privileged communication clauses also appear i n laws of A r i z o n a , Florida,
Georgia, Iowa. Louisiana, M a r y l a n d , M i c h i g a n , and Tennessee.
†Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 157 N . E . 604 (Supreme Court of Massachusetts)
July 5, 1927.
††Florida, Missouri, N e w Hampshire, and V i r g i n i a .
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poena, however, even though they remain the accountant's
property, in the absence of statutory privilege. For his own
protection it has been suggested that in such cases the account
ant should make photostatic copies of the working papers for
his own files.
If an accountant is sued for negligence, or if he finds it
necessary to sue a client for a fee, he may properly disclose
to the court, orally or by reference to his working papers,
such information as to the scope of his work or the nature
of his service as may be necessary to defend himself or to
establish the justice of his claim. He would be guilty of pro
fessional misconduct, however, if on such an occasion he made
gratuitous disclosures of his client's affairs unrelated to the
question under litigation.
What is the accountant's

duty if he discovers

serious

wrongdoing on the part of a client, of a nature which cannot
be corrected or be disclosed in the financial statements or the
accountant's report? He can only withdraw from the engage
ment. He should not voluntarily inform even those who may
be injured by the client's acts. He must remember that he is
engaged because his professional status marks him as one who
can be trusted, and he must not violate that trust though it be
reposed in him by a client who proves to be unworthy. He
may,

and should, get rid of a dishonest client, but he should

not break the confidential relationship.
In considering the accountant's position it is of interest to
note what the legal profession says about the duty of its
members with respect to confidences of a client. Canon 37 of
the canons of professional ethics of the American Bar Asso
ciation reads as follows:
"37. Confidences

of a Client. It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve

his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and
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extends as well to his employees; and neither of them should accept
employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these
confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his em
ployees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and
consent, and even though there are other available sources of such in
formation. A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers
that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his
former or to his new client.
"If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from dis
closing the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention
of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences
which he is bound to respect. He may properly make such disclosures
as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom
it is threatened."
INTERPRETATIONS
Following is a summary of opinions expressed by committees on pro
fessional ethics of the American Institute of Accountants in response
to actual inquiries:
Confidential

Relationship

The question has been asked whether a certified public accountant is
guilty of violation of the ethics of the profession in the following cir
cumstances: He was engaged to audit the accounts of two institutions
under state control and claimed to have discovered serious irregulari
ties and, possibly, fraud; having reported these to his superior officer
and failing to receive consideration there, he reported to the district at
torney, and receiving no consideration in that quarter disclosed his find
ings to the public through a political organization—asserting that he
was employed by and was working for the citizens of the state. If the
accountant was engaged as independent auditor in a professional capac
ity, he violated the confidential relationship between client and auditor
by such disclosure; if he were an employee of the state, he was prob
ably ethically correct in disclosing the facts to the citizens of the state
who were, in truth, his real employers.
Responsibility

of Accountant

in Tax

Evasion

A certified public accountant who is also enrolled to practice before
the Treasury Department, discovers in auditing a client's books (a cor
poration consisting of one stockholder) that the books do not reflect the
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entire income of the company, and did not during the previous year when
the accountant also audited them and prepared and filed the corporate
tax returns. After calling the client's attention to the tax evasion, if the
client agrees, is it advisable for the accountant to prepare amended re
turns for the previous year and see that the books are corrected for the
current year? If upon presenting the matter to the client he is unwill
ing to take steps to correct the situation, the question is asked whether
the accountant should report the matter to the Treasury Department
notwithstanding the confidential relationship existing between the ac
countant and the client.
The committee believes that the accountant should write to his client,
bringing all relevant facts to his attention even if he has previously
done so orally, and urge that voluntary amended returns be filed. If the
client refuses to rectify the situation the accountant should withdraw
from the engagement and in his letter of withdrawal should give the
reasons for his action. Under the Treasury Department rules, an en
rolled agent has performed his duty when he has notified the taxpayer
that a violation has been committed. Under the rules of ethics of the
Institute, a member is not required to advise the Treasury Department.
It is believed that one of the most important issues involved is that of
legal responsibility, and it is advised that the accountant consult his
attorney.
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"Professional Dignity"
Implicit in many of the rules of professional conduct which
will be discussed in the following pages is a basic assumption
which may be described by such expressions as "The profes
sional man must maintain his dignity," or "The professional
man must avoid the taint of commercial practices," or "In a
profession, certain things are not done," or, simply, "The pro
fessional man must be a gentleman." These statements are
all perfectly true, but they leave unanswered questions which
may arise in the mind of the student—particularly the ques
tion, "Why?"
This is a skeptical age, in which "debunking" is a favorite
indoor sport, in which the "stuffed shirt" is a popular object
of youthful derision. Dignity is regarded with suspicion, as a
pose to conceal human frailties. Pretensions to social superi
ority are regarded with scorn or amusement. If the certified
public accountants of today gathered at their meetings, as they
did fifty years ago, in frock coats, striped trousers, and high
silk hats, the community would burst its sides laughing. No
course of conduct can be enforced in this day by the simple
admonition, "It isn't done."
There are, however, much better reasons than that behind
Rule 3 and all the rules of professional conduct, and the most
convincing is self-interest.
When the early public accountants made the deliberate and
irrevocable decision that they were, by the nature of their
work, engaged in the practice of a profession, and not a busi-
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ness, and that they would aspire to public recognition as mem
bers of a profession, they made a bargain with society. They
asked the community to repose confidence in their competence
and

integrity, and in return they offered to justify that con

fidence by maintaining a course of behavior designed scrupu
lously to protect the interests of those who employed account
ants and those who relied on their opinions.
A businessman is not ordinarily equipped to judge for him
self the technical competence or the integrity of a professional
certified public accountant. When he engages an accountant,
the client, in a very real sense, puts himself in the accountant's
hands. He reveals to the accountant his most private affairs
and generally is prepared to follow his advice without ques
tion. Why should he do this, unless he is convinced that the
accountant is interested in something other than making
money? If money-making, which is regarded as the principal
objective of commercial activity, were assumed to be the
accountant's sole motive, it would be dangerous to employ
him,

because the intimate knowledge of the client's affairs

which the nature of his work is bound to give him, offers
immeasurable opportunities for exploitation of the client.
To

establish a custom in the business world of engaging

professional certified public accountants, therefore, it was
necessary to persuade businessmen that the accountants were
interested in serving society, as well as in making a living;
that their integrity was stronger than their acquisitive in
stincts; that the privileges and immunities which the com
munity conferred upon them were too valuable to be risked
for immediate cash.
This job of persuasion was, if you like, a public-relations
problem. The rules of professional conduct were an important
medium for advertisement of the profession's intentions. They
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guaranteed self-discipline in an area where external discipline
was impracticable. They also projected a mode of behavior
different from that ordinarily associated with commercialism
—a mode of behavior which may be described as "professional
dignity." This was a way of enabling businessmen to dis
tinguish the professional motive of pride in service from the
commercial motive of profit. Professional dignity is a con
stant reminder to the public that the certified public account
ant regards himself as engaged in a profession, not a business.
The

type of behavior which supports it deliberately excludes,

for example, advertising and solicitation, which we shall dis
cuss later. Any behavior which confuses, in the businessman's
mind, the concepts of profession and trade; any behavior
which arouses a subconscious suspicion that, after all, certified
public accountants are out first of all for the money, is defi
nitely injurious to the economic and social opportunity of the
accounting profession as a whole.
The

young accountant who loses patience at hair-splitting

distinctions in questions of professional conduct, who derides
what seem to him the meaningless conventions of professional
etiquette, should take a second thought. These conventions
are in large part what stamp him as a professional man. They
are his trade mark, the value of which is just as real to him
as the brand name on a famous product to the manufacturer.
Later in this book it will be necessary to refer frequently
to professional dignity, which is as convenient a term as any
to describe the concept which has been discussed here. When
ever the term occurs, the reader is requested to incorporate
by reference all the discussion in this chapter.
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C H A P T E R 12

Commissions, Brokerage, and Fee
Splitting
Professional dignity is an additional reason for the pro
hibition in Rule 3 against giving or receiving commissions or
brokerage, or splitting fees with the laity. These things are
not reprehensible in the commercial, non-professional field.
But if a certified public accountant engages in them, the client
may

suspect that the accountant's attitude and motives are

more commercial than professional. This is likely to weaken
the client's confidence and the accountant's prestige.
Protection of the interests of clients is another purpose
which underlies Rule 3. As noted on page 5 5 , this dualpurpose rule was designed partly to fortify the accountant's
independence, but one motive behind it was to avoid situations
which might lead clients to suspect either that accountants
were paying commissions, which must ultimately come out of
the client's pocket, to laymen who helped them obtain the
engagements, or that their accountants were enriching them
selves on the side, indirectly at the client's expense, by accept
ing commissions from vendors of goods or services the pur
chase of which the accountants recommended.
Even if a client did not object to the payment of a com
mission which would ultimately come out of his pocket (busi
nessmen are accustomed to the idea that nobody works for
nothing), there is an important reason why the accountant
should not accept them. The basis of his relationship with
the client is confidence. The client trusts him, or he would not
have him around the place. If the client accepts his recom-
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mendation for the purchase of a calculating machine, or some
other product or service about which the accountant might
be expected to know more than the client himself, he has a
right to assume that the accountant has the client's best inter
ests in view. If he finds that the accountant has accepted a
commission from the vendor, the client may wonder whether
this particular product was really the one best suited for his
purpose, and the most economical, or whether the accountant's
recommendation was actuated in part by the hope of personal
gain.
Recommending accounting machines may be a legitimate
part of the professional service rendered by the accountant,
as in the installation of an accounting system. Compensation
for the time and effort which the accountant may properly
devote to investigating and choosing the most suitable facili
ties should be included in the fee which the client pays him.
In these circumstances, the client will not question the objec
tivity with which the recommendation was made.
INTERPRETATIONS
Following are summaries o f recent opinions by the American Institute of
Accountants committee on professional ethics i n response to requests for inter
pretation o f Rule 3 on participation i n profits from commercial activity, or
sharing fees with the l a i t y :
Commissions
It is asked whether it is proper for a commercial banker to offer to
any accountant 10 per cent each month of the gross income from any
customer the accountant may refer to him. Rule 3 forbids a member of
the Institute to accept "commissions, brokerages or other participation
in the fees, charges or profits of work recommended or turned over to
the laity as incident to services for clients. . . ."
Payment to Widow of Deceased Partner
The question arises whether a member may properly pay to the widow
of another accountant a percentage of fees the member may obtain from
work done for former clients of her husband, as consideration for the
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acquisition of the practice of the deceased. Such an arrangement would
be, substantially, the purchase of the goodwill of the accounting prac
tice and Rule 3, prohibiting division of fees with the laity, would not
apply.
Participation

in Profits by Estate of Partner

Attorneys have been retained to draw new partnership articles for a
firm of accountants, the partners of which are members of the Insti
tute, whereby on the death of any partner, his capital, as shown on the
books at date of death, shall be repaid within one year from the date
of the appointment of a representative of his estate. Also, the deceased
partner's estate shall be entitled to share in the profits of the firm for
five years. The attorneys question whether this would be in violation
of Rule 3. There appears to be nothing objectionable from the point
of view of the rules of professional conduct of the Institute in the pro
posed provisions of the partnership articles submitted.
Participation

in Profits by Widow

of Deceased

Partner

It would be improper for a firm practicing as certified public account
ants to include as a partner any person who is not a practicing certified
public accountant and whose qualifications do not justify the designation
or description of the firm as used. An arrangement could be made
whereby the widow of the deceased partner would receive a share of
earnings, based on her husband's goodwill value in the firm, without
making her a member of it.
Payment

of Bonus by Client

to Accountant's

Employee

A client, appreciating the services of one of a member's junior staff
men, wishes to give him a Christmas bonus of $500 as a gift from him
personally. It is asked whether there would be anything unethical or
inappropriate in the client's paying the accountant's employee this bonus.
While no Institute by-law or rule of professional conduct covers the
question, it is believed it should be considered to what extent such a
gift might affect the independence of the employee in respect of such a
client. Also, whether such a substantial gift would not put the employer
under some feeling of obligation to the client. Minor gifts to employees
are fairly common and not considered objectionable but the amount
mentioned seems rather substantial. Perhaps an increase in the fee from
the client and a promotion with a raise in salary for the staff assistant
would be a better course.
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Practice by Corporations
Rule 11. A member or an associate shall not be an of
ficer, director, stockholder, representative or agent of any
corporation engaged in the practice of public accounting
in any state or territory of the United States or the District
of Columbia.
Having imposed upon its members numerous important
responsibilities to clients and to the public, the profession has
found it necessary to prohibit evasion of responsibility by
practice of the profession in a corporate form of organization.
A corporation may be sued for damages, but the liability
of its stockholders is limited by law. Accountants who formed
a corporation for the practice of their profession might be
tempted (or, equally important, the public might suspect that
they might be tempted) to take risks which they would not
assume if they were personally fully responsible for their acts.
Certification of financial statements by a corporation whose
employees have audited the accounts is inconsistent with the
fundamental concepts of professional behavior and respon
sibility.
Again, a corporation is impersonal. The public does not
know who the principal stockholders are. The officers might
be certified public accountants and the staff might consist
entirely of experienced and able auditors, but the controlling
stockholder might be a layman, whose major interest was
financial gain. He would stand wholly outside the jurisdiction
of the professional accounting societies or other authorities
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which have disciplinary power over certified public account
ants under law. Free from professional control, such a stock
holder might nevertheless be in a position to dictate the poli
cies of the corporate accounting firm. If such conditions were
prevalent the whole idea of accounting as a profession might
as well be abandoned. In spite of all protestations the public
would recognize it as a business, and rightly so.
As long ago as 1919 the council of the Institute adopted
the following resolution:
RESOLVED, That there be submitted to the general meeting of the
Institute a proposition that within three years from this date no mem
ber of the Institute be permitted to continue his membership if he be
an officer, director or responsible manager of an audit company or other
corporation or other company maintaining a department organized for
the purpose of carrying on a general accounting and auditing practice,
unless all the stockholders and directors and officers of such corporation
be and continue to be practising public accountants.
The

ultimate result of this resolution was the incorporation

in the rules of professional conduct, in 1941, of Rule 11, as
quoted above.
Certified public accountant laws of the following states con
tain provisions specifically prohibiting either the practice of
public accounting or the use of the designation "certified pub
lic accountants" by corporations: Arizona, California, Colo
rado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mis
souri, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Okla
homa, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas.
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Use of Accountant's Name by Another
Rule 2. A member or an associate shall not allow any
person to practice in his name who is not in partnership
with him or in his employ.

There are two rules intended to prevent a member from
serving as a "front" for an unqualified accountant over whose
work the member does not exercise authoritative supervision
and control. The first of these is Rule 2.
This rule is intended to prevent a practice which seems so
obviously undesirable that it should hardly require mention.
However, there have been occasional reports of arrangements
in

contravention

of

this rule. Sometimes

certified public

accountants have shared office space or made working arrange
ments with accountants not in possession of C P A certificates,
or even with other certified public accountants, under which,
while no partnership or employment agreement exists, there
is an appearance of such an agreement. Sometimes stationery
has been used listing the names of both individuals. Some
times the arrangement has permitted the non-certified public
accountant, who is not subject to the rules of the professional
societies, to seek engagements by promising the assistance of
the certified public accountant, whom the rules would not
permit to solicit engagements himself.
There can be no objection to the association of two account
ants for proper purposes, toward the accomplishment of which
they can be helpful to one another, but care should be exer
cised not to mislead the public into the impression that one
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is acting for the other or assumes responsibility for the acts
of the other, unless this is the truth and the related responsi
bilities are actually assumed.
Rule 2 is not solely intended to guard against the use of a
"qualified" name by an "unqualified" accountant. There is
another type of situation which it is intended to discourage.
A member of the Institute (let him be called A ) may wish to
share office space with another member (call him B ) , who
enjoys the larger practice. There is no objection whatever to
such an arrangement, and B generously agrees. A then finds
that he could secure more important or larger engagements
if he could represent himself as part of B's organization, since
B has gained a wider reputation in the community than him
self. It might seem natural to A to offer B a share of the fees
for the privilege of using B's name in this manner.
Rule 2 says that B may not accede. It would be just as
improper for him to do so as if A were not a certified pub
lic accountant and a member of the Institute, and his offices
were at the other end of town. Only if the responsible rela
tion of employee to employer exists, or if the two men legally
share responsibility as partners, may one practice the pro
fession in the name of the other.
INTERPRETATIONS
Following is a summary of opinions expressed by committees on professional
ethics o f the American Institute o f Accountants i n response to inquiries on
Rule 2:
Association

of Accountants Not Partners

A member has recently entered into an agreement with an accountant
who is not a CPA, to practice public accounting. All income earned by
either one is to be treated wholly as his own; all office overhead is to
be paid equally, and all office equipment used wholly by one is to be
paid for by himself, and equipment used jointly to be paid for jointly.
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If either works with the other on any particular work, the net income
is to be divided equally. The letterhead will read "
,
and Company," and will bear one name as C P A
and the other accountant's as tax counselor. The questions are raised
whether this is in accord with the Institute's rules of professional con
duct and what is the proper form in signing audit and other reports.
The suggested letterhead appears to be somewhat misleading. A client
or prospective client not informed as to the agreement would be led
to believe that the two accountants were co-partners, contra to the fact.
Clients of the other accountant would be justified in assuming that they
had the benefit of the knowledge, training and experience of a certified
public accountant, whereas in fact this would not be true unless the
member had been engaged to cooperate in a particular matter. The most
important objection is that if reports for clients of the other accountant
were signed in the name of the firm, credit grantors and others would
have no way of knowing the certified public accountant had not par
ticipated in the examination in any way.
Conduct of Practice

by Employee

The committee finds some ground to question the suggestion that a
public accounting practice be carried on in the name of the proprietor,
who is entering the armed forces, by an assistant who is not a certified
public accountant or a member of the Institute. Rules 2 and 6 are the
ones which seem to relate. The committee feels that there would be
some ground for criticism if reports were signed in the name of the pro
prietor or presented on his stationery as a certified public accountant
when neither he nor any other certified public accountant was in fact
supervising the work. The committee suggests that it might be pos
sible for the proprietor to make an arrangement with another firm of
certified public accountants, or an individual practicing certified public
accountant, to safeguard his practice while in the service, utilizing the
present assistants as employees. It is possible that he might form a
partnership with the assistant he intended to leave in charge to continue
the practice for the duration of the war. This, of course, would neces
sitate the elimination of the title "Certified Public Accountant" in con
junction with the firm name.
Participation

in Profits

by Non-Certified

Accountant

A member has been practicing accounting with another certified pub
lic accountant as a partnership. They are considering an arrangement
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whereby a public accountant, who has been in practice for the past ten
years, will enter into an agreement that the gross earnings of the part
nership be pooled, and the firm and the public accountant share the ex
penses and the division of net proceeds in a predetermined ratio. They
ask whether this plan would be ethical under the rules of professional
conduct of the Institute. There are obvious objections to the contem
plated plan: first, that the arrangement provides for sharing professional
fees with a non-certified public accountant who does not directly con
tribute to the earning of such fees and who does not generally and reg
ularly serve the clients of the partnership; and second, it is possible that
the non-certified public accountant, unhampered by rules of professional
conduct, could freely indulge in activities which would subject him to
censure if he were a member of the Institute and, of course, that the
certified public accountant would share in the proceeds of the activities
described.

[77]

C H A P T E R 15

Certification of Statements Audited
By Others
R u l e 6. A member or an associate shall not sign a report
p u r p o r t i n g to express his o p i n i o n as the result of examina
t i o n o f financial statements unless they have been examined
by h i m , a member or an employee of his firm, a member or
a n associate of the Institute, a member of a similar associa
t i o n i n a f o r e i g n country, or a certified p u b l i c accountant o f
a state or territory o f the U n i t e d States or the D i s t r i c t o f
Columbia.

Rule 6 in part seems to overlap Rule 2 , but it contains an
important exception.
The first half of Rule 6 does, in effect, repeat the admoni
tion implicit in Rule 2 that a member shall not lend his name
to work done by others than his partners or employees. Cases
have been reported in which accountants not in possession of
C P A certificates have obtained engagements in which it was
necessary that opinions expressed on the financial statements
be signed by a certified public accountant. In such a situation
the non-certified accountant might approach a friend who held
a C P A certificate, and offer a portion of the fee if the certi
fied public accountant would sign the report. The non-certified
accountant would hardly be considered "laity," within the
meaning of Rule 3, yet it would be highly undesirable that a
certified public accountant lend his name to work performed
by another who was under no legal or moral responsibility to
him, and over whose work the certified public accountant had
no supervisory authority. N o intelligent certified public ac
countant would wish to put himself in such an equivocal posi[78]
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tion, and the instances have undoubtedly been rare in which
such offers have been accepted. Rule 6 serves to put the public
on notice that when the name of a member of the Institute
appears it may safely be assumed that he has supervised, and
assumes direct responsibility for, the related work.
The

important exception included in the latter part of

Rule 6 is intended to permit collaboration among qualified
and

accredited professional accountants or accounting firms

in conducting parts of a single engagement. For example,
firm X, composed of members of the Institute, auditing the
accounts of Blank Corporation, whose main offices are in New
York, may request firm Y , also composed of Institute mem
bers, to examine the inventory of the Corporation's California
branch. Firm Y submits its report of the examination, for
which it assumes full responsibility to firm X, and the latter
is entitled to rely on it, to incorporate the Y report in its
working papers, and to certify the financial statements of the
Corporation as a whole, in which the California branch inven
tory is incorporated. This type of collaboration is quite com
mon.

It saves a good deal of time and substantial amounts

of traveling expenses. It is wholly proper and desirable.
To all intents and purposes, firm Y in this situation serves
as the agent or employee of firm X . The instructions as to
how the examination of the branch office inventory is to be
conducted are provided by X . Y's report is submitted to X ,
not to the client. Y is compensated for its work by X , not by
the client. Y's name does not appear in the report. X assumes
control of and responsibility for the entire engagement, but
for the time being relies on firm Y as though it were a branch
office of firm X . Such reliance is permitted, it will be noted,
only if firm Y is composed of members of the Institute (or a
similar foreign association)

or certified public accountants,
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which is another way of saying that firm Y is subject to the
same disciplinary control, and may be presumed to maintain
as high standards, as X itself.
An extension of the same procedure occurs quite often in
the audit of accounts of large corporations, with numerous
subsidiary companies, which publish consolidated financial
statements. In such a case the accounting firm responsible for
the entire engagement generally examines the accounts of the
parent corporation, and ordinarily those of subsidiaries which
are geographically accessible. However, it sometimes happens
that a recently acquired subsidiary prefers to have its work
done by auditors whom it had retained when it was inde
pendent of the present parent. If these auditors are members
of the Institute or certified public accountants, Rule 6 permits
the firm certifying the consolidated statements to rely on the
certificate of its colleagues with respect to the subsidiary,
and incorporate its accounts in the consolidation.
Again, when American corporations have subsidiaries or
branches abroad, the auditors certifying the consolidated state
ments may rely on statements certified by foreign accountants,
provided they are, in the words of Rule 6, members of a
"similar association [similar to the Institute] in a foreign
country"; and may incorporate the foreign accounts in the
consolidation.
FORWARDING

FEES

When one certified public accountant asks another to help
him by performing a part of an engagement, such as the
examination of a branch-office inventory, the one who does
the work may be compensated by the first accountant in any
manner which is mutually agreeable—in most cases, probably,
at his regular rates. When one certified public accountant asks
another to perform an entire engagement, however (such as
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the audit of a subsidiary company, or any other engagement
which for any reason the first accountant does not wish to
carry out himself),

the accountant performing the work

usually submits his bill directly to the client. In this case it is
entirely proper for the accountant who referred the work to
receive what is known as a "forwarding fee."
This question was discussed before the council of the Insti
tute in May 1944 by a member of the committee on profes
sional ethics. He said, in substance, that such arrangements
are fairly common among law firms but the understanding
prevails among lawyers that the fees shall be reasonable. Such
a principle could well apply to accountants. A forwarding fee
should not be so great as to allow only a small margin of
profit to the firm doing the work. That firm should have the
proper professional interest and the feeling of responsibility.
Forwarding fees may be allowed not only by one Institute
member to another but by an Institute member to a certified
public accountant not a member or to a foreign accountant
who is a member of a recognized professional

association.

INTERPRETATIONS
Following is a summary of opinions expressed by committees on professional
ethics of the American Institute of Accountants i n response to inquiries on
Rule 6:
Reliance on Reports of Others
A firm of specialists in insurance investigations prepared reports on
a western branch of an eastern insurance company. The question is
raised whether it would be proper for a member to sign a report ex
pressing his opinion on thefinancialstatements of the company based
on audit of the home office records by his own firm, and reliance on the
report of the specialists on the western branch. In view of the fact that
the firm of specialists in insurance investigation is not composed of cer
tified public accountants and does not qualify under any of the excep
tions permitted in Rule 6 of the rules of the Institute, an expression
of opinion by a member as a result, to any material extent, of an ex-
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amination by such specialists would be regarded as a violation of Rule 6.
Certification

of Statements Audited

by Branch-Office

Manager

A member states that for several years his firm has served clients in
a fairly distant city and has accomplished this by sending staff members
to that city and having them return to the office with their working
papers for review of the principals. The firm now wishes to open an
office in that city with an accountant as manager, who is neither a CPA
nor a member of the Institute. The firm members will fully supervise
all his activities as well as those of other staff assistants there, and all
reports will be reviewed and signed at the main office. An opinion is
requested as to the propriety of the proposed procedure.
Rules 2 and 6, which might bear on this question, both clearly permit
a member to allow another person to practice in the name of the mem
ber if such person is in the member's employ; and also permit a member
to sign a report or express his opinion as a result of examination of finan
cial statements if such statements have been examined by an employee
of the member's firm.
Forwarding

Fee

The question is asked whether an accountant is under any obligation
to pay a commission to another accountant who, without any prior ar
rangement, recommends him to a prospective client. There should be
no obligation on the part of the accountant so recommended to pay a
forwarding fee. Payment of forwarding fees is entirely proper when
arranged in advance with acquiescence of both accountants, but it would
be undesirable to encourage expectation of a commission merely for sug
gesting another accountant's name.
Gradual

Purchase

of

Practice

It is the opinion of the committee that there can be no objection to
the purchase by a member of the Institute of the accounting practice
of another accountant, although the gradual purchase of a practice, part
by part, over a period of time, is unusual. In such circumstances care
should be taken to avoid violation of Rule 2, providing that a member
shall not allow a person to practice in his name who is not in partner
ship with him or in his employ; or Rule 6, providing that a member
shall not sign reports not prepared under his own supervision or that
of other specified responsible persons. Any evidence that purchase of a
practice of a non-certified accountant was a device for securing clients
by unethical means would constitute grounds for complaint.
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IV. T H E INTEREST OF T H E
PROFESSION
CHAPTER

16

Advertising
Rule 10. A member or an associate shall not advertise his
professional attainments or services. The publication of what
is technically known as a card is restricted to an announce
ment of the name, title (member of American Institute of
Accountants, CPA, or other professional affiliation or desig
nation), class of service, and address of the person or firm,
issued in connection with the announcement of change of ad
dress or personnel of firm, and shall not exceed two columns
in width and three inches in depth if appearing in a news
paper, and not exceed one-quarter of a page if appearing in
a magazine, directory, or similar publication.
It was said earlier in this book that the rules of profes
sional conduct of the accounting profession were essentially
of two types: the first designed primarily to protect the inter
ests of the public, including clients (or perhaps rather to re
assure the public that the profession is vitally concerned with
protection of the public interest); the second designed pri
marily to advance the interests of the profession itself.
Even in the second category there is evident the basic motive
of encouraging the kind of behavior on the part of profes
sional accountants which will inspire public confidence and
respect. This means essentially the kind of behavior which is
good for the public, and that is what the rules in the first
category prescribe.
It might be more meaningful to say that the first, and
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larger, group of rules is mainly concerned with ethics, and
the second with etiquette. The first group is surely the more
important—violations are regarded as much more serious
than in the second. Actually violations of rules within the sec
ond

group are more frequent, which indicates that the con

cepts inherent in the rules of the first group are so funda
mental that accountants

instinctively comply with them—

their intelligence would warn them against the actions pro
scribed even if the rules did not exist. It doesn't require a for
mal

pronouncement to tell a professional certified public ac

countant that he should be independent, that he should not
be negligent, that he should keep his clients' secrets, and so
on. The rules on these subjects are intended more for the in
formation of the public, perhaps, than of members of the
profession, whose personal experience will soon inform them
adequately.
The

rules which remain to be discussed, especially those

dealing with advertising, solicitation, and competitive bidding,
are,

however, frankly for the information of members of the

profession. They require a course of conduct, the wisdom of
which the individual's experience might not demonstrate, but
the collective experience of the whole profession does. They
are good examples of social rules, aimed to protect the inter
ests of the group against the selfish or egoistic impulses of
the individual.
Rule 10 prohibits advertising. This rule is almost univer
sally observed in the profession today; violations are few and
far

between. When it was adopted nearly thirty years ago,

however, it was a center of violent controversy, and non
conformists were numerous. Even today it is the subject of
more inquiry and interpretation than any other rule. This is
doubtless because there is nothing about advertising which is
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self-evidently wrong. Many eminently respectable people ad
vertise their products or services. Banks advertise. It may
seem to some individuals like unreasonable duress to forbid
them a practice in which the community as a whole finds noth
ing intrinsically improper.
Younger accountants, starting in practice for themselves,
naturally burn with the desire to become known widely enough
to attract some clients. They have to have clients to pay the
rent. One cannot blame them for impatience with a rule which
bars their access to the medium through which they might
become widely known most quickly. They sometimes suspect
that the rule against advertising is a result of a conspiracy
among their older and more successful colleagues to protect
themselves against new competition. This is reflected in the
gibe, "First get rich—then get ethical." Or at least, the young
men may think, the rule is the result of "stuffed shirt" think
ing, the old-fashioned notion of dignity and decorum with
which the modern generation has so little patience.
Actually the rule against advertising has many sound rea
sons to support it. They may be summarized as follows:
(a) Advertising doesn't pay. Professional accounting service
involves a peculiarly intimate personal relationship.
The client opens his private affairs to the accountant.
Naturally he prefers to engage an accountant whom he
knows personally. The accountants in the early days
who tried advertising agreed for the most part that
it did not attract clients.
(b) Advertising is not appropriate. Professional accounting
service is not a commodity. Its value depends on the
knowledge, skill, experience, and integrity of the ac
countant. One can appropriately advertise the merit
of a tangible product, but who would be impressed
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with a man's own statement that he is smart, skilful,
experienced, and honest? One prefers to engage a phy
sician who is recommended by friends who have bene
fited by his ministrations. The same is true of a lawyer
and a certified public accountant.
(c) Advertising smacks of commercialism. Recognition as a
member of a profession has real value. (see pages
66-68). Why throw it away by behaving as though one
were in business?
(d) Advertising would not benefit the young practitioner. If
it were generally permitted and regarded as desirable
the larger, well established firms could afford to ad
vertise on a scale that would throw the young prac
titioner wholly in the shade. The reason advertising
sometimes seems tempting to him is that no other
accredited accountants indulge in it. For a few dollars
he could be the center of attention, because there is no
competition. If there were a free-for-all, his little
advertisement would be buried.
PUBLISHED

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Rule 10 does permit announcements of limited size and
content for specific purposes. Announcement of change of
address or personnel of firm has been interpreted to include
the opening of a new office.
"Class of service" is intended to mean a brief statement,
such as "audits, systems, taxes," not a lengthy essay describ
ing in detail all the services the accountant is prepared to
render. Since the types of services a certified public accountant
is prepared to render are now widely known, it seems no
longer necessary, in a mere announcement, to describe the class
of service rendered.
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The limitation of size of announcements to two columns
in width and three inches in depth in newspapers, and onequarter page in magazines, directories, and similar publications,
is, of course, quite arbitrary. It seemed desirable for the sake
of uniformity, and to keep peace in the family, to fix a definite
limitation on size. Without some limitation it was feared that
adventurous and ambitious members might be tempted to buy
full pages in newspapers to announce that they had moved
around the corner.
Here is a form of announcement which is entirely proper:
JOHN DOE
Certified Public Accountant
Announces the Opening of His Office
on September 15, 1941
1500 Jefferson Building
New York, New York
Jefferson 4-4000
Here is a form which would not be considered as in con
formity with Rule 10:
John Doe
Formerly with Roe & Associates, Management Engineers and
Accountants, 1924 to 1 9 3 5 ;
Assistant Tax Department Manager, A B C Rubber Company,
1935 to 1941;
Subsequently Manager of the Tax Department, X Y Z Department Stores
Announces
The Organization of the Firm of
JOHN DOE & COMPANY
Certified Public Accountants
and
Tax Consultants
with offices at
1500 Jefferson Building
New York
Telephone Jefferson 4-4000
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SPECIALTY
Consultant on Federal, State, and Local Taxes
O T H E R SERVICES
Consultant on priorities, wage stabilization, manpower, and
other government regulations
Audits, Systems, Costs, Budgets, Special Investigations,
and Business Organization

Decorative display and conspicuous typography should be
avoided. The purpose of a professional man's announcement
is to inform existing clients and friends of something which
they presumably would wish to know, not to attract the world's
attention. It would look silly to announce the admission of a
new partner to a professional firm in a form of layout which
resembled the advertisement of a popular cigaret.
A n announcement in the public prints should be repeated
only a few times—enough to accomplish its purpose. If notice
of change of address in January still appears in the paper in
the following December, the advertiser's motive will be suspect.
ANNOUNCEMENTS THROUGH T H E MAIL
Cards bearing announcements, of the nature and form per
missible for publication in the public prints, may properly be
sent through the mails to clients and friends, that is, to those
who presumably would wish the information contained in the
announcement. This does not mean every mere acquaintance,
nor every banker and lawyer in town: particularly it does not
mean friends who are served by other public accountants.
N o type of advertisement other than formal announcements
should be sent through the mails. One may, of course, com
municate to his own clients and personal friends anything
which he believes would interest them, and some firms make
a practice of sending their clients letters calling attention to
important tax legislation or decisions, and similar occurrences.
[88]
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The moment such a letter reaches someone who is not a client
or a personal friend, however, it becomes advertising, and is
ground for complaint.
BOILER

PLATE

Publishers of tax services have long followed the practice
of printing little booklets summarizing new tax legislation.
These booklets are offered for sale, with imprint on the cover
of the name and address of any accountant who may wish to
send them to his clients. Such material may not be mailed to
others than clients without violating the rules. The Institute's
committee on professional ethics does not view with pleasure
such use of prefabricated material, even for the edification of
clients. The appearance of the accountant's name might seem
to some recipients of the booklet to signify that he prepared
the contents, which is not the fact. If the accountant believes
the material would be useful to his client, there is no need of
having his name printed on the booklet. With better effect he
may

simply write a personal note to his client explaining why

it is sent.
LISTINGS I N D I R E C T O R I E S
The

Institute's committee on professional ethics has pro

mulgated two fairly detailed statements interpreting Rule 10
as it applies to listings in directories, as follows:
"The committee on professional ethics has received a number of ques
tions as to the effect of Rule 10 of the rules of professional conduct of
the American Institute of Accountants, which was recently amended.
"This amendment of the rule was originally recommended by the
Advisory Council of State Society Presidents. The council of the In
stitute approved the recommendation, and authorized submission of the
amendment to the members of the Institute at the annual meeting in
October, 1943. The members present at the meeting approved the
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amendment, whereupon it was submitted for a vote by mail ballot, and
a majority of all the members of the Institute voted affirmatively, mak
ing the amended rule effective January 10, 1944. . . .
"The amendment consisted of eliminating from the earlier rule the
provision permitting publication of 'cards' as a regular method of ad
vertisement. The present rule permits the publication of 'cards' only
for the specific purposes of announcing change of address or personnel
of firm.
"The committee on professional ethics has already officially inter
preted the phrase 'change of address' to include announcement of the
opening of a new office (see The Certified Public Accountant, Decem
ber 1943, Page 3 ) .
"More recently, the committee has interpreted the rule in its appli
cation to listings of names and addresses of members and associates of
the Institute in directories. The committee believes that the rule pro
hibits such listings in bold type, or in any other form which differen
tiates them from other names and addresses in the same list. This belief
is based on the language of the rule, which states that a member or
an associate shall not advertise his professional attainments or services.
In the committee's judgment, directory listings in special type or boxes
are a form of display advertising intended to attract attention to the
professional services of the firm or individual so listed.
"The committee believes that the amended rule does not prohibit
members and associates from being listed in telephone and other general
directories, but that the use of special type or other form of display to
attract attention constitutes advertising, is undignified and unprofes
sional in character, and is detrimental to the interests of the profession
as a whole."

"The question has been submitted to the American Institute of Ac
countants committee on professional ethics whether the name, address,
and professional qualifications of a member of the Institute may be listed
in a directory without violation of the rules of professional conduct.
"It is the opinion of the committee on professional ethics that it would
be a violation of Rule 10 of the rules of professional conduct if de
scriptive information about the professional qualifications of a member
or an associate were published with his name and address in a directory,
in consideration of any payment, direct or indirect, by such member or
associate.
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"This opinion is based upon the language of Rule 10, which states
that 'members or associates shall not advertise their professional attain
ments or services.' In the opinion of the committee, the publication of
descriptive material in conjunction with the listing of the name of a
member or an associate in a directory, in consideration of any payment
by him, would constitute advertisement of his professional attainments.
"The committee believes that the listing of the name and address of
a member in a directory with the designation 'Certified Public Account
ant,' firm affiliation, and 'Member, American Institute of Accountants,'
where appropriate, but without any further descriptive language, would
not be a valid basis for complaint.
"However, the committee has already expressed the opinion (see The
Certified Public Accountant, March 15, 1944, page 8) that Rule 10
prohibits such listings in bold type or in any other form which differ
entiates them from other names and addresses in the same list."
When these statements were issued they were received with
extraordinary enthusiasm all over the country. For years it
had been a source of irritation among certified public account
ants in the several communities, that a few would pay to have
their names printed in classified telephone directories in type
larger and blacker than the others, or in little boxes with deco
rative borders. Even those who were paying for the added
prominence seemed relieved to have someone tell them to
stop. Whole communities of certified public accountants agreed
unanimously to cease the practice, with much satisfaction to all.
A D V E R T I S I N G PAID F O R BY O T H E R S
The rule against advertising is intended to deal with selfadvertising. It is not intended to prevent public recognition of
the personal achievements of an accountant. If an accountant
writes a book, his publishers may properly advertise the quali
fications of the author. If an accountant runs for political
office his party may, of course, advertise his attainments.
Newspaper publicity about accountants, including their firm
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names, is not advertising, but gratuitous recognition of some
thing they have done which is of public interest. The test of
propriety is who pays for the advertisement. If the accountant
himself does, it is taboo.
One exception to this general statement arises from

the

following rule of the Treasury Department's committee on
practice, in Treasury Department Circular 230

(as

revised

1941):
"Sec. 2(v). No enrolled attorney or agent shall in any manner
whatsoever solicit, directly or indirectly, or by implication, employment
from persons not clients or friends in matters before the Treasury De
partment or in matters related thereto. Among other things the fol
lowing shall be deemed to be prohibited by this paragraph:
" 1 . The publication of articles or the delivery of addresses on fed
eral tax questions by an enrolled person over the radio or elsewhere in
connection with which the name of the firm of which he is a member,
associate, or employee, or the address of the writer or speaker is given
either by the writer, speaker, announcer, or publisher, provided that
nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the publication, by peri
odicals admitted to second-class mailing privileges, of such information
concerning contributors of articles as is usually published in such pe
riodicals. . . . "
This rule applies only to persons registered to practice be
fore the Treasury Department.
INTERPRETATIONS
F o l l o w i n g are summaries of recent opinions o f the A m e r i c a n Institute o f
Accountants committee on professional ethics i n response to requests for inter
pretation of Rule 10, on a d v e r t i s i n g :
Advertisement

of Specialized

Service

Rule 10 is intended to limit public advertisements by members or
associates of the Institute to very simple cards announcing changes of
address or personnel. A description of a special type of work for war
contractors would be considered an advertisement of the professional
services of the member or associate concerned, which is specifically pro
hibited by the rule. A circular letter containing the same information
would also be regarded as not permissible under the rule.
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Announcement
The committee does not favor frequent repetition of announcements
of change of address or personnel in newspapers. The committee re
gards it as preferable to publish the announcement only once, though
no definite rule to this effect has been laid down.
Announcement

of New

Practice

In the case of a member embarking upon public practice for the first
time it is believed permissible to publish in the press a simple card an
nouncing his undertaking and a similar announcement might be sent by
mail to persons whom the accountant knows. However, it is undesir
able to send such announcements to clients of a former employer.
Notices announcing the formation of a new firm or the beginning of
a new practice may be mailed to acquaintances who are not clients of
other public accountants.
Notices of Formation

of

Partnership

Three members of the Institute are contemplating forming a part
nership to practice as certified public accountants. One is a member of
the staff of a firm of certified public accountants at the present time.
They ask whether they would be permitted to mail cards announcing
the formation of a partnership to (a) clients served entirely by the staff
accountant, including signing of reports and fixing fees; (b) clients
obtained by the staff accountant. Under Rule 10 as amended, members
are permitted to announce the formation of a new partnership in the
form of a card in a newspaper; also to send similar announcements
to friends and acquaintances. However, the committee feels it might
be in bad taste to refer to former affiliations and it might cause resent
ment on the part of former employers. The committee wishes to draw
attention to the fact that sending announcements to clients of former
employers might be regarded as a form of solicitation in violation of
Rule 7.
Cards
The insertion of a card in a weekly circular of a service club would
constitute a violation of Rule 10 as amended.
Under Rule 10 it is not permissible for a member to run an occa
sional card, giving his name, address, and type of service, in a national
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trade publication or in the classified section of an international news
paper.
Announcements
The committee sees no objection to an accountant's sending a notice
that he is leaving a government agency and joining the staff of a public
accounting firm, so long as the notice is sent only to his personal friends.
It is not in conflict with the rules of professional conduct for an ac
countant to address a letter to his clients informing them of a change
in name under which the accountant practices.
Advertising

(Blind)

A member has inquired whether a blind ad, reciting that he was
available evenings and week-ends to keep books, prepare statements, etc.,
would conform to the ethical rules of the Institute. An advertisement
of this nature would appear to violate Rule 10 of the Institute's rules
of professional conduct. Such an advertisement might also be held to
violate Rule 7. Finally, such an advertisement, which would be con
sidered in bad professional taste, might be held to come under Sec. 4(d)
of Article V of the Institute's by-laws.
Boiler

Plate

A ruling has been requested as to the use of imprints by accounting
firms on booklets prepared by various tax services, explaining features
of new tax provisions, to clients and others who request them. If a
member desires to furnish his clients with material prepared by others,
there is no Institute rule which forbids such distribution; but distribu
tion of tax bulletins and similar material should be confined to clients
presently served by members. The committee believes the distribution of
such material is intended as advertising, however, and would be glad to
see the discontinuance of printed material bearing the names of Insti
tute members. Such pamphlets might mislead recipients into the belief
that the material had been prepared by the accountant when in fact it
had been prepared by a publisher and sold to the accountant. Informa
tion can be conveyed to clients by letter or memorandum, or by referring
them to publications readily available which contain such information.
Desk

Calendars

The rules of professional conduct of the Institute do not deal spe
cifically with distribution of calendars. While wide latitude is permitted

[94]

Advertising
members in their communications with clients, there are limits based
on a sense of reality and propriety. The committee is of the opinion
that the spirit of Rule 10 is violated when members advertise otherwise
than in the form and under the circumstances set forth in Rule 10 as
amended. The committee is of the opinion that the distribution of desk
calendars by a member constitutes a violation of Rule 10 of the rules
of professional conduct of the Institute.
Firm

Bulletins

The publication of firm bulletins is permitted under the Institute's
rules if such bulletins are distributed only to partners and staff of the
firm, to clients and personal friends—but any wider distribution of firm
bulletins is not favored.
Display

Advertisement

The Institute's rules would not permit display of a member's profes
sional card in an electrically operated signboard in the lobby of a hotel.
Distribution

of Tax

Chart

A member had charts printed on the optional method of withholding
the Victory tax, which bore his name on the bottom. He had intended
to use these only for clients, but others made requests for them. He has
inquired whether, if he gave these charts out to those who requested
them, it would be considered advertising, since they bore his name. It
is the opinion of the committee that the rules of professional conduct
would not prohibit his giving persons other than clients copies of the
chart referred to if such persons requested copies on their own initia
tive. It would not be proper to advertise the existence of the chart and
thus invite requests. If a relatively few copies were given to personal
acquaintances who requested them, and they were not clients of other
public accountants, there would be little likelihood of any objection,
but if a large number were distributed to persons other than clients in
any general manner, a complaint charging violation of the rules might
be made.
Accountant's

Certificate

in Display

Advertising

The question has been asked whether there is any impropriety in an
accountant's certificate being used by a sales company in its newspaper
and window display advertising as evidence of the reasonableness of
prices offered for sale. While the issuance of such a certificate would
not violate the by-laws or rules of professional conduct of the Institute,
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it should be discouraged so far as possible, since the use of an account
ant's name in this manner is undignified and tends to lower respect for
the profession in the mind of the public. An accountant should consider
the possible effect on his own standing as a professional accountant which
might follow the use of his name in such a manner.
Preparation

and Distribution

of Tax

Literature

There is nothing in the Institute's rules of professional conduct which
would prevent a member from writing for compensation an article,
pamphlet, or booklet in reference to preparation of individual federal
income-tax returns, provided the accountant had nothing to do with the
distribution of the booklet, which would subject him to the rule against
advertising.
Preparation

of Tax

Articles

It would not be a violation of the Institute's rules of conduct for a
member to write, at the request of a local chamber of commerce, an
article explaining a revenue act for publication in a monthly magazine.
However, the Treasury Department rules may prohibit announcement
of the accountant's firm name in such instances.
Tax Information

to

Clients

So long as distribution of a form letter dealing with current tax probblems is restricted to clients it would not conflict with the Institute's
rules of professional conduct.
Comic

Relief

A client has prevailed upon an accounting firm to sponsor a team in
a bowling league. The partners ask whether it would be permissible to
use the firm name on the back of bowling shirts without referring to
the firm as accountants. There is no rule which refers specifically to
such displays, but the committee believes such a practice would be con
trary to good professional etiquette, and would tend to degrade the
practice of public accounting.
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C H A P T E R 17

Solicitation
Rule 7. A member or an associate shall not directly or
indirectly solicit the clients or encroach upon the practice of
another public accountant, but it is the right of any member
or associate to give proper service and advice to those asking
such service or advice.
Solicitation of professional engagements has always been
regarded with disfavor by high-minded members of any pro
fession. There is something inherently distasteful and humili
ating in asking for purchase of the personal skill and integrity
of the applicant. The mere act of solicitation places the appli
cant in a position psychologically inferior to that of the person
who may engage him. Particularly in the case of a professional
certified public accountant, who must not forget his responsi
bility to the public as well as to his client, it is desirable that
the professional advisor and the client be on terms of equality.
It is sometimes necessary for an accountant to tell his client,
as for a physician to tell his patient, what is good for him,
whether he likes it or not. Occasionally, an accountant finds it
necessary flatly to refuse to certify a statement in the form
the client desires. It may be difficult for the accountant to pre
serve a position of authority if he has solicited the engage
ment in the first place.
Rule 7 , however, does not forbid solicitation per se, but
only solicitation of the clients of other public accountants.
This is a concession to those who argue that there should
be no bar to the enlightenment of potential clients who do not
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presently enjoy the benefits of professional accounting assist
ance. Unfortunately, however, the rule in its present form
does not emphasize the undesirability of solicitation in any
circumstances, but rather suggests that its main object is to
prevent professional accountants from poaching on one an
other's preserves. This emphasis may obscure the primary
purpose, which is in the interest of both the public and the
profession, to keep the certified public accountant from placing
himself in an inferior position by asking for work.
The secondary purpose, of preserving harmony within the
profession, would be, however, sufficient justification alone for
the existence of the rule. There is nothing which so annoys a
professional man as to find that his client has been approached
by another. This irritation does not spring entirely from mer
cenary motives. It comes rather from hurt pride, and is the
more disturbing therefore. Relations between a certified pub
lic accountant and his client, like those of any professional
man, are personal and friendly, based on mutual confidence
and respect. The interloper who tries to break such a relation
ship, and supplant the accountant who enjoys it, may be sure
of the latter's dislike. Solicitation causes unfriendly relations,
and the organized profession is fully justified in stamping it
out in the interests of the group as a whole. Discord and dis
unity within endanger the existence of any social group—
family, club, or nation—and the individual who would create
it must be restrained for the sake of the group as a whole.
W H A T IS S O L I C I T A T I O N ?
There is no precise definition of solicitation of accounting
engagements. T o write letters asking for work, openly or
inferentially, or to ask for it orally, would certainly be solici
tation. There is nothing improper, however, in making oneself
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known in the community by means of activity in civic or social
groups, by public speaking or writing for publication. Nor is
it considered bad form to admit, if pressed, that one is a
certified public accountant.
When overtures are made by a potential client, an account
ant is wholly at liberty to respond to them. The rule against
solicitation does not prevent the accountant from discussing a
possible engagement with anyone who broaches the subject,
even though he be presently served by another accountant. In
such instances, however, it is considered good manners, and
it is certainly good sense, to refuse to talk about fees, or other
details, until the client has informed his present accountant of
the decision to make a change. Then, with the client's permis
sion, the accountant who is to succeed to the engagement will
do well to speak to his predecessor frankly, informing him of
the circumstances and leaving no lingering doubt as to who
took the initiative in bringing about the change. This practice
is no more than common courtesy. It is widely followed and
has engendered much goodwill among fellow practitioners.
HOW

T O BUILD A PRACTICE

If a young practitioner newly embarked on a professional
career is not permitted to advertise or to solicit engagements,
how is he to obtain clients? One candidate in an oral exami
nation responded to this question by saying that he had no
recourse but to go into the closet and pray.
Actually it is unwise to undertake public practice until one
has a sufficient circle of friends and acquaintances in a com
munity to justify the hope that announcement of the opening
of an office will bring some requests for professional assistance.
After that, good work will lead to further requests. There is
no advertisement like a satisfied client.
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A newly established practitioner may ask friends to recom
mend him to others. Bankers, lawyers, and other certified
public accountants are often in a position to do so. But the
newcomer must be patient, and he must have enough capital
to be able to wait for the first engagements. It takes time for
a community to realize that a new public accountant is in its
midst.
Above all, the newly established practitioner should resist
the temptation to throw himself in the way of clients of an
other firm of whose staff he was formerly a member. He met
those clients as an employee of the other firm, and he will
get off on the wrong foot if he seeks to lure them to his own
office. If they approach him of their own volition, that is
another matter.
INTERPRETATIONS
F o l l o w i n g are summaries of recent opinions o f the American Institute of
Accountants committee on professional ethics i n response to requests for inter
pretation of Rule 7 on solicitation:
Municipal

Audits—Solicitation

The Institute's rules of professional conduct apply to the conduct of
members and associates of the Institute in any type of professional prac
tice. Both Rules 7 and 10 apply to municipal accounting and auditing
with as much force as to any other accounting service. It is not, how
ever, a violation of the rules of conduct for a member of the Institute
to write letters to a governmental body asking to be considered as audi
tor of that body when a change of auditors is made, when it is commonly
known that it is the policy of the body to rotate auditors.
Addresses Before Business

Groups

A member has inquired whether he may send letters to trade asso
ciations, offering to speak at their meetings on subjects of general in
terest on which he is well informed. Addresses by accountants before
business groups are highly desirable, but it is preferable that such ad
dresses be delivered in response to unsolicited invitation or through ar
rangement by state or national professional organizations of account
ants. Direct written solicitation of opportunities to speak before trade
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associations might be regarded as violation of Rule 10 (advertising) or
Rule 7 (solicitation) if the association itself were a client of another
member or associate.
Solicitation

of Clients

of Dissolved

Partnership

A member of the Institute, without violating the rules of professional
conduct, may solicit for his own account former clients of an account
ing firm now dissolved, of which said member was a partner, in the
absence of any special arrangement covering the point, since the good
will of a partnership is the goodwill of all the partners, and the clients
of such a firm are clients of all partners of the firm. An equitable ar
rangement is one under which all the former partners, upon dissolu
tion, may write a joint letter to all the former clients requesting such
clients to indicate their wishes as to which of the former partners should
carry out the assignment and retain the working papers in the future.
After such an indication on the part of the client any solicitation of that
client by another former partner would be cause for discipline under the
rules of professional conduct of the Institute.
Sale of Book Coupled with Tax Service
There would be no violation of the rules of the Institute in the prep
aration and sale of a book on taxation by a member, but if the sale of
the book were coupled with an agreement to prepare a tax return for
the purchaser, the solicitation for sale of the book would in effect con
stitute solicitation for tax work, and in the opinion of the committee
would violate the rules of professional conduct.
Use of Professional
Stationery
A member serving as an officer of a fraternal organization mailed to
members of this organization some literature, using his accounting firm's
letterhead instead of that of the organization. Complaint was filed claim
ing that he violated the code of ethics relative to advertising. Mailing
of the material submitted does not appear to be directly prohibited by
any of the Institute's rules of conduct. Complaint was probably made
on the ground that such distribution violates the rules against indirect
solicitation prohibited by Institute Rule 7. It is also possible that a
letterhead such as the one employed, when sent to non-clients, might
be regarded as advertising of professional attainments or services, which
is prohibited by Rule 10, with particular reference to description on the
letterhead of practice enrollments and the type of services rendered by
the firm. It is highly desirable to avoid even the appearance of bad taste.
[ 1 0 1 ]
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The following question is asked: When an accountant is offered an
engagement, without any solicitation on his part, but knows or is in
formed that the concern is the client of another accountant, under
Rule 7 must the first accountant before accepting the engagement as
sure himself that the accountant who had been doing the work had been
notified of the termination of his employment? It is the belief of the
committee that Rule 7 is intended only to apply to cases in which an
accountant solicits the clients of another accountant. However, a num
ber of accountants do follow the practice, before accepting a new en
gagement, of notifying the incumbent accountant, or having the client
notify him, of the termination of his employment.
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CHAPTER

18

Competitive Bidding
Rule 14. A member or an associate shall not make a com
petitive bid for professional engagements in any state, ter
ritory or the District of Columbia, if such a bid would con
stitute a violation of any rule of the recognized society of
certified public accountants or the official board of account
ancy in that state, territory, or district.
Another practice highly detrimental both to the welfare of
the public and of the accounting profession is competitive bid
ding for professional accounting engagements. Some public
bodies are required by law or ordinance (or think they are re
quired) to seek competitive bids for audits as they do for the
purchase of cement or lumber. Some businessmen, who are in
the habit of giving or receiving bids in their own daily work,
consider it no more than prudent to shop around for account
ing service as they would for an automobile. The best official
explanation of the reasons why this practice is wholly unde
sirable is the following statement by the executive committee
of the American Institute o f Accountants:
"Competitive bidding for engagements to render professional service
is unsound and illogical. Certified public accountants and their profes
sional societies have long endeavored to discourage, or even forbid, the
practice, on the ground that it is harmful both to those who receive the
service and to those who render it.
"The reason for opposition to competitive bidding is a belief that com
petitive bidding for audit engagements is not in the best interest either
of the public or of the accountancy profession: it is not inspired by a
desire to restrict free and fair competition, nor an effort to monopolize
accounting practice.
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"An audit consists of an examination of accounting records and un
derlying data in conjunction with independent confirmation of certain
items which are susceptible to that kind of check. The extent of the
examination, that is, the number of records of actual transactions which
will be scrutinized, and the number of items which will be indepen
dently confirmed, must rest largely on the judgment of the auditor. It
is his duty to make sufficiently extensive investigations and tests to sat
isfy himself that the records and financial statements reflect fairly the
financial position of the enterprise and the results of its operations.
The cost of such an examination depends largely upon the time spent
by the certified public accountant and his assistants in doing the work
described. The final product is the accountant's opinion as to whether
the financial statements as submitted do present fairly the position and
the results of operations, with perhaps further detailed comment on vari
ous items for the information of those requiring additional information.
The opinion may be valueless if offered by an incompetent person, or if
offered on the basis of an examination which is inadequate to enable the
accountant to form a valid opinion. The client, however, cannot know
whether the opinion he has received is of value unless something later
occurs to prove the contrary.
"The accountant's opinion is far from being a mere intellectual abstrac
tion. The readiness with which bankers, creditors, federal and state
governmental agencies and taxing authorities, and all other third parties
who must rely on accounting statements accept them is a definite and
concrete matter on which the success or failure of important business
transactions may depend. Decisions may be taken by the owners or man
agers of enterprises on the strength of an accountant's opinion and state
ments which may have serious and far-reaching results. There is no
comparative measure of such results either on a qualitative or quantita
tive basis.
"A comparison of fees or rates quoted by two or more accountants
is worthless since there is no means of measuring the relative value of
the services rendered. With price competition there is a strong tempta
tion to the less scrupulous accountant to submit a lower bid than is
justified by the requirements of adequate performance. When the work
is awarded to him, he then finds himself in a position where, if he is to
make a profit, or avoid losing money, he must curtail the scope of the
examination, or employ assistants at lower than customary salaries.
"Just as an individual would employ a physician in whom he had
confidence, those requiring accounting services should employ a certified
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public accountant in whom they have confidence, rather than one who
offers to perform the work at a lower price. In the long run the client
must depend upon the accountant's judgment. There is no way in which a
client can check the accountant's mental processes and those of his as
sistants to determine that an adequate examination has been made.
"Even detailed specifications of the work to be done serve as no pro
tection, because it is impossible to specify the exercise of good judg
ment. Laying down rules of procedure to be followed by an accountant
by no means assures a good audit. A competent accountant, after com
mencing an engagement, might find many things in the specifications
which were unnecessary in the given case, and many steps not mentioned
in the specifications which should be taken.
"Opposition to competitive bidding does not indicate any intention
to seek uniformity in fees or rates for accounting services, nor to in
terfere in any way with arrangements as to fees, rates, or scope of work
which may properly be made between the client and his accountant.
The propriety of settling and completing such arrangements before or
after the accountant is engaged is unquestioned. Nor is it suggested
that clients or prospective clients may not properly inquire and be in
formed as to the amount or basis of an accountant's fees for services
under discussion.
"Experience has shown beyond any doubt, however, that selection
of accountants on a competitive price basis leads to poor quality of work.
Often audits undertaken on the basis of competitive bids are not worth
even the relatively small amount paid for them. Competitive bidding is
incompatible with service of a proper professional standard."

It is difficult, however, to formulate a rule against bidding.
A n accountant is entitled to work for as little as he pleases,
or for nothing i f he wishes. A client is entitled to have some
estimate, however tentative, of the probable cost of an engage
ment. Such an estimate is not competitive bidding unless an
other accountant has made a similar estimate on the same
work. The existence of an earlier estimate, however, cannot
always be known. It is not easy to define and prohibit competi
tive bidding without appearing to "combine in restraint of
trade," or to expose the public to exorbitant charges.
Then again, if a professional society imposes such a rule
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upon its members it may put its members at the mercy of other
accountants who are not members. The latter may bid freely,
it is argued, while the former could not respond in kind with
out violating the rule.
In spite of these difficulties several state societies of certified
public accountants have tried their hands at rules on this sub
ject. Some of the rules adopted are as follows:
". . . In his professional relations and practice, every member should
observe the following precepts of conduct, viz.:
". . . He should not knowingly, directly or indirectly, enter into bid
ding for any type of professional service whatsoever, in competition with
other accountants. (Competitive bidding is hereby defined as bidding for
work in competition with other accountants on any basis, except that
the quoting of minimum per diem rates of $25.00 for senior account
ants and $15.00 for assistant accountants, plus traveling expenses, is not
considered to be competitive bidding; except also, that an accountant
shall not be deemed to be in competition with other accountants if he
was the last accountant to render services substantially similar to those
for which bids are required.)" [Virginia]
".Competitive bidding is deemed to be detrimental to the interests of
the public and the accounting profession. A member shall not at any
time knowingly, directly or indirectly, enter into bidding for any type
of professional service whatsoever, in competition with other accountants.
Competitive bidding is hereby defined as bidding for work in competi
tion with other accountants on any basis." [Connecticut]
"Competitive bidding is declared to be inconsistent with the practice
of a profession and the best interests of the public which it serves.
"In view of the above declaration,
"(a) No fixed or maximum price shall be quoted for any accounting
engagement without submitting therewith a definite statement of
the scope of the work to be performed.
"(b) No member shall offer to perform any accounting service for a
fee which, in total or per diem, is less than that which was re
ceived by another member, for services rendered within the cur
rent or previous fiscal year, of substantially the same nature and
scope, unless the member previously engaged acknowledges his
discharge or retirement from the engagement.
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Lack of sufficient knowledge and understanding of the work un
dertaken upon which the last fee was based or of the existence
of such fee, shall not constitute a defense for violation of this rule.
Subject to the above provisions the quotation of per diem rates
without a fixed maximum shall be permitted at all times."
[Louisiana]

In 1 9 3 4 the council of the Institute adopted the following
resolution:
"RESOLVED, That the council of the American Institute of Account
ants regards competitive bidding for professional accounting engage
ments as contrary to the best interests of members' clients and of the
public generally and urges members of the Institute to endeavor by all
means at their disposal to eliminate the practice of competitive bidding."
Later, however, some of the state societies which had
adopted rules against competitive bidding urged the Institute
to support them more strongly. They asked the Institute to
adopt a rule with teeth in it. Discussion led to the conclusion
that attempts to deal with this problem should originate in
local societies, and that it would be impracticable for the
national organization to impose a blanket rule, which might
not be acceptable in some communities. It was decided, how
ever, that the Institute could properly require its members to
observe any rule on bidding adopted by the society of any
state, when they were practicing in that state.
The

result was Rule 14, adopted in 1 9 4 1 , which is quoted

at the head of this chapter.
It is the general opinion in the profession that competitive
bidding will be eliminated only when individual certified public
accountants refuse to quote "flat fees" for engagements when
ever they suspect that other accountants are being asked to
do likewise. Enlightened self-interest should ultimately lead
to that happy result. Bidding tends to drive down the fees of
all accountants to the bare subsistence level, and this tendency
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does not encourage professional work of the most painstaking
and thoughtful character. A vicious circle is thus described,
and both the public and the profession suffer from it.
INTERPRETATION
F o l l o w i n g is a summary of a recent interpretation of Rule 14 by the A m e r 
ican Institute of Accountants committee on professional ethics:
The Institute has no rule prohibiting competitive bidding as such.
Rule 14 is designed only to support state societies which may adopt
rules against competitive bidding, by requiring Institute members who
may not be members of state societies to observe such rules in those
states. The state society's definition of what is competitive bidding
would doubtless be governing if a complaint were lodged under this
rule. It is not believed that submission of an estimate would violate
such rules unless the accountant knew, or could reasonably be expected
to know, that other accountants were being requested to submit esti
mates simultaneously.

[108]

CHAPTER

19

Offers to Employees of Other Accountants
Rule 8. Direct or indirect offer of employment shall not
be made by a member or an associate to an employee of an
other public accountant without first informing such account
ant. This rule shall not be construed so as to inhibit nego
tiations with anyone who of his own initiative or in response
to public advertisement shall apply to a member or an asso
ciate for employment.
The strength of an accounting firm lies in its personnel. A l l
it has to sell is brains and experience. A well-trained staff
assistant is highly valued and is difficult to replace. If another
firm of accountants should wish to secure the services of such
a man by offering a higher salary, the least the present em
ployer is entitled to is sufficient advance notice to discuss the
matter with the employee, and to attempt to retain him. It is,
therefore, a principle of common courtesy and fair dealing
which is expressed in Rule 8.
Some staff assistants have complained that the rule favors
employers, and impedes those on the staff who wish to improve
their positions. They say that a man cannot seek a better job
without jeopardizing the job he holds, since the present em
ployer may resent the desire of a staff man to leave, and the
prospective employer will be reluctant to negotiate with him
until the present employer has been notified. This is not re
quired by Rule 8, although it is a common custom, arising
from the natural desire of the prospective employer not to
give offense to a fellow practitioner.
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The plain truth of the matter is that secrecy in human rela
tions provokes ill will. It is better to be frank. Lasting enmi
ties arise from incidents which allow one man to think he has
been deceived by others.
A staff accountant who has confidence in his ability should
not worry about making a living. He can afford to be inde
pendent, and there is no trait which he can develop to better
advantage for a career in the profession of accounting.
Therefore, a staff man who is dissatisfied with his progress
should first tell his employer and learn the reason why. The
employee may be convinced by the discussion that the fault is
partly his own, and may discover how to overcome it. If not,
he is a free man, and he should not lack the courage to say
that he intends to look for a better job. If the employer re
sents this frankness it is to his discredit, and stamps him as a
narrow man. His resentment will not prevent any other ac
countant from offering employment to the staff man. All a
prospective employer will insist upon is that the present em
ployer shall have been put on notice of the staff man's
intention.
Rule 8 is not intended to bind staff assistants to their jobs,
and does not in fact do so. It is intended to avoid ill will
among members of the profession, and thus to strengthen its
unity, to the advantage of all its members. The rule is also
intended to warn the occasional less scrupulous practitioner that
he may not with impunity try to lure staff assistants from their
present employers, who may have taught them all that now
makes them valuable. If a staff assistant of his own initiative
wishes to change jobs, Rule 8 places no barriers in his way.
INTERPRETATIONS
F o l l o w i n g are summaries o f recent opinions b y the A m e r i c a n Institute of
Accountants committee on professional ethics i n response to requests for inter
pretation of Rule 8:
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The members of the committee are unanimous in the belief that the
rules do not prohibit public advertisement for staff assistants in classi
fied advertising columns devoted to employment opportunities. If such
an advertisement were worded in a particularly objectionable way per
haps it could be criticized on other grounds. In the opinion of the com
mittee it would be an unreasonable extension of Rule 8 to interpret it
as applicable to such advertising, and it would be unwise to interpret
the rule in such a manner that employees might feel they were unduly
restricted in efforts to seek employment.
Employer-Employee

Relationship

Under the Institute's rules a member may employ an accountant,
presently employed by another member of the Institute, when the em
ployee of his own volition has requested a position.
Rule 8 restricts the extent to which a prospective employer may offer
employment to an employee of a fellow practitioner but does not re
strict the extent to which an employee may seek employment elsewhere.
It would, however, be desirable to notify the present employer of an
intention by a staff assistant to seek a new position, in order to avoid
embarrassment to a prospective employer who might consider engaging
him.

The committee has received the following question: "Some years ago
I was offered a position on the staff of a public accounting firm. The
owner stated he had an agreement with his employees that in the event
they left his employ they would refrain from going into public account
ing practice in the same city, either as individuals or for another ac
counting firm. At that time I declined the offer. Later I accepted his
offer, but nothing was said regarding the agreement referred to earlier
in our discussions. I anticipate going into public practice in the near
future, and will give my present employer ample notice. Periodically
my employer has called attention to this agreement and our responsi
bility in the event we seek other employment. In the event my present
employer claims he has a verbal contract, do you believe he has any
professional grounds to bar me from pursuing my accounting activity in
the city in which he practices?"
The committee replied as follows: "The conditions and limitations
imposed on you by the contractual relation between you and your em-
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ployer is a legal question on which we cannot attempt to express an
opinion. Whether or not you are under a moral or actual professional
obligation depends on all the facts. In view of your employer's periodic
announcements of his policy, which you do not say you openly objected
to, he might claim that 'silence gave consent' and that you tacitly ac
cepted his conditions of employment. In the absence of an agreement
or understanding, we know of no ethical precept which should prevent
an employee of a public accountant from seeking employment elsewhere
or undertaking practice on his own account. In the latter event, the
rules of professional conduct of the Institute would prohibit solicitation
of clients of other public accountants, including those of your former
employer."
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Use of Professional Description with
Firm Names
Rule 1. A firm or partnership, all the individual mem
bers of which are members of the Institute (or in part mem
bers and in part associates, provided all the members of the
firm are either members or associates), may describe itself as
"Members of the American Institute of Accountants," but a
firm or partnership, not all the individual members of which
are members of the Institute (or in part members and in part
associates), or an individual practicing under a style denoting
a partnership when in fact there be no partner or partners,
or a corporation, or an individual or individuals practicing
under a style denoting a corporate organization shall not
use the designation "Members (or Associates) of the Ameri
can Institute of Accountants."
The first rule of conduct, and one of the longest, is of the
least significance. It merely specifies the circumstances under
which the designation "members (or associates) of the Ameri
can Institute of Accountants" may be used in conjunction with
a firm name.
This rule requires no explanation. However, it should be
noted that the reference to corporations is obsolete in view of
the later adoption of Rule 11.
Most state accountancy laws contain provisions similar to
Rule 1 with respect to use by firms of the designation "certi
fied public accountants"; that is, the designation may not be
used unless all members of the partnership are certified public
accountants. Partnerships of certified public accountants main-
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taining offices in more than one state should consult the laws
of each state concerning use of the designation. The provi
sions differ among the several states.
The Treasury Department goes even further, and says that
no enrolled agent may use a firm name indicating a partnership
when in fact he is practicing as a sole proprietor. Section 2(e)
of Circular 230 says:
"(e) Every enrolled attorney or agent practicing as an individual
shall use his legal name in the conduct of his legal, accounting, or other
professional practice. The term 'company,' 'associates,' 'accountants,'
'auditors,' 'engineers,' or other plural forms suggesting a partnership, or
language of similar import, used in connection with a name or title, or
any fictitious title, or trade name, shall be used only by a bona fide
partnership consisting of two or more members, and all stationery, list
ings, advertisements, and announcements of enrolled persons shall con
form to the principles herein stated."
Some accountants regard this rule as unduly harsh. Its in
tent obviously is to prevent an individual from practicing under
a style which might lead the public to believe that more than
one person shared the responsibility for work undertaken.
The question sometimes arises whether it is proper for sur
viving partners to continue practice under a firm name con
taining names of partners no longer members of the firm.
The council of the Institute has answered this question un
equivocally. It adopted the following resolution at a meeting
in October 1943:
" W H E R E A S , The American Institute of Accountants committee on
state legislation has requested the council of the Institute for an expres
sion of opinion as to the Institute's policy toward legislative proposals
which would prevent continuation of a firm name containing the names
of former partners who have died or who have withdrawn from the
partnership, and
" W H E R E A S , Said council of the American Institute of Accountants
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believes it desirable that the policy of the Institute on this question be
recorded;
" N o w THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That in the opinion of the coun
cil of the American Institute of Accountants neither the public interest
nor the interest of the accounting profession as a whole would be served
by legislation preventing the use by public accounting firms of firm
names or titles which contain the names of partners who have died or
withdrawn from the firm; and be it further
"RESOLVED, That the committee on state legislation be instructed to
oppose legislative proposals of the type described in this resolution."

The Institute's committee on professional ethics, in October,
1945, issued a memorandum on ethical considerations respect
ing choice of name for a firm of public accountants, the text
of which is, in part, as follows:
"The purpose of this memorandum is to indicate the principles that
should be observed by certified public accountants in partnership in
choosing a firm name and style for the partnership.
"The name of a firm of practicing accountants should denote a per
sonal association. Such a firm should not adopt for its name any nonpersonal or misleading title. A corporate form of name would not be
appropriate as the name of a firm of professional accountants.
"Inclusion in the firm name of the name of a former partner or
former partners has been held by the council of the American Institute
of Accountants to be entirely appropriate. . . .
"The rules of professional conduct do not expressly prohibit the use
of the words 'and Company' by a member of the Institute in practice
on his own account, without partners. The use of such style has been
questioned on the ground that it implies the existence of a partnership
and therefore might be misleading. . . ."
INTERPRETATIONS
F o l l o w i n g is a summary o f opinions expressed by committees on professional
ethics o f the A m e r i c a n Institute of Accountants i n response to inquiries on firm
styles:
Continuation

of Firm Name by Sole

Survivor

The question is asked whether, on the death of a partner, the sole
surviving partner may continue practice as an individual but continue
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use of firm name. There is no prohibition in the Institute's rules against
continuing the use of the firm name (although Treasury Department
rules prohibit practice by an individual under a partnership style), but
it would be a violation of the Institute's rules if the description "Mem
bers American Institute of Accountants," were used in conjunction with
a firm name indicating a partnership when in fact a sole proprietorship
existed.
Description

of Associates

An associate of the American Institute of Accountants who wishes
to show this affiliation in his letterhead may do so by the description,
"Associate, American Institute of Accountants." Two associates of the
Institute, forming a partnership, may inscribe on the firm letterhead the
description "Associates of the American Institute of Accountants" (see
Rule 1), but not "Members of the American Institute of Accountants."
Description

of Firm Including

One Member

A firm of accountants, consisting of one member of the Institute and
one non-member, may not properly cause its name to be listed in a clas
sified telephone directory under the caption "American Institute of Ac
countants."
Partnership

with Non-Certified

Accountant

There is no intent underlying any of the rules to prevent a partner
ship between a member of the Institute and one who is not a member,
or between a certified public accountant and one who is not a certified
public accountant. Rule 4 regarding an occupation incompatible or in
consistent with that of a public accountant was intended to cover
activities in which it might be held that a public accountant could not
appropriately engage simultaneously with the conduct of professional
accounting practice. For example, it might be held that a public ac
countant should not at the same time be an investment dealer, or se
curities salesman.
Use of Designation

"Member"

by

Non-Practitioner

A member of the Institute not in practice as an accountant, but as
a statistician, may use the designation "Member of the American In
stitute of Accountants" on letterheads used in the conduct of his busi
ness or statistical reports or studies, so long as this title is not used in
conjunction with solicitation of business. If the member showed his
Institute affiliation on his letterhead, he would be expected to observe
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the rules of professional conduct as though he were engaged in public
accounting practice.
Signing of Report

by One Member

of Firm

It is not in itself necessarily improper for a partner of a firm, who
is a certified public accountant—the other partners not being certified
—to sign reports with the firm name and below it affix his own signa
ture with the designation "Certified Public Accountant." However, any
practice which might lead the reader to the belief that the firm was
entirely composed of certified public accountants when such was not the
case would be grounds for criticism.
Use of "CPA" by Out-of-State

CPA

Most states do not permit use of the initials "CPA" on letterheads
and business cards by one who obtained his certificate in a state other
than the one in which he is now practicing, but some permit use of the
designation with parenthetical designation of the state of original
issuance.
Use of Designation

"Associate"

in Firm

Name

There is no rule of the Institute which would prohibit the use of the
term "and Associates" in a firm name. Some members of the Institute
have adopted that designation and no objection has been raised to its use
by certified public accountants.
Use of Firm Style Including Names of Deceased or Retired
Partners
The Institute's rules do not prohibit continuation of an accounting
practice under a firm style including the name of a deceased partner.
Many members practice under such firm names.

A certified public accountant purchased the practice, including the
goodwill and firm name, of a certified public accountant who had, in
turn, bought his partner's interest at a prior date. It is not a violation
of the Institute's rules to continue practice under the firm name, al
though neither of the men of whose names it consists are now connected
with the firm.
Partnership

Use of Individual

Name

The following question has been submitted: "My son recently became
my partner. Before I could change the name of the sole proprietorship
to indicate a partnership, he entered the Army. In the circumstances
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is it in order for me to continue to practice under an individual name
and continue my son as a partner, sharing the income?"
There is nothing in the rules of professional conduct to prevent the
arrangement. The Treasury Department rules restrict the use of names
denoting a partnership when in fact a sole proprietorship exists. Since
this situation appears quite the reverse, there seems no reason why any
one should object.
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C H A P T E R 21

Miscellaneous Questions
All the existing rules of professional conduct promulgated
by the American Institute of Accountants have been discussed
in the foregoing chapters. As these rules are printed in the
current yearbook of the Institute, the following note appears
in conjunction with them: "These rules of conduct supplement
the disciplinary clauses of the by-laws."
This statement is a signal that a member may find himself
the object of a complaint even though he has violated none
of the sixteen specific rules. Turning to Article V of the by
laws, he will find that Sec. 4 provides that a member or an
associate renders himself liable to expulsion or suspension if he
is held by the council to have been guilty of an act discreditable
to the profession. Clearly no group of men would be wise
enough to reduce to writing, in the style of formal rules, any
or all conceivable actions that might be considered a cause for
disciplinary action by a professional body. The catch-all phrase
penalizing "conduct discreditable to the profession" is an
essential basis of the disciplinary structure.
Article V also provides for expulsion or suspension of a
member if he refuses or neglects to give effect to any decision
of the Institute or of the council; or if he infringes any of the
by-laws or rules of professional conduct; or if he is declared
by a court of competent jurisdiction to have committed any
fraud; or if he is declared by any competent court to be insane
or otherwise incompetent; or if his certificate as a certified
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public accountant is revoked or withdrawn by the issuing
authorities.
The same article provides that a member or an associate
may be expelled if the council, sitting as a trial board, finds
that he has been convicted of a felony or other crime or mis
demeanor involving moral turpitude. If in such a case the con
viction shall be reversed by a higher court council may reinstate
the individual concerned. This provision enables the profes
sional society to protect itself against the stigma of harboring
an individual who has been found guilty of serious infractions
of the law, without the necessity of the professional society's
reviewing all the facts in the case, in effect re-trying the
accused, and forming an opinion as to whether or not he is
guilty. In other words, expulsion or suspension from the pro
fessional society may be virtually automatic as a result of
conviction by a court. While this provision may work harshly
upon individuals who on appeal to higher courts are found to
have been convicted in error, the provision for reinstatement
in this event mitigates the severity of the professional society's
action. When the group as a whole can suffer from the pres
ence of an individual who is under a cloud as a convicted law
breaker, it is not too much to ask that he withdraw from the
group, at least until his conviction shall have been proved
unjust.

COMPLIANCE W I T H RULES OF G O V E R N M E N T
BODIES
With the growth in number of government agencies em
powered by statutes to regulate certain industries and certain
business activities, accounting has been found to be a major
instrument of regulation. Many of the regulatory bodies have
promulgated uniform systems of accounts, or accounting rules,
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which the corporations subject to their authority are required
to observe.
Question has arisen on several occasions whether certified
public accountants, certifying financial statements subject to
the

authority of regulatory bodies, should be required to

observe the accounting rules of such bodies.
The

Securities and Exchange Commission has

criticized

accountants for certifying statements to the Commission which
did not in all respects conform with the published rules of the
Commission. The question is dealt with in a report on behalf
of the council of the American Institute of Accountants, dis
cussing an opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
as follows:
"The criticisms of the Commission direct attention to a matter which
is of great importance today, when accountants are being called upon
to an increasing extent to report upon or certify statements prepared
for the purpose of meeting requirements of government agencies or com
missions. Clearly in such cases the accountant undertaking the examina
tion is charged with the responsibility of familiarizing himself with the
requirements of the agency or commission in question. If he fails to do
so, or if he finds that these requirements have not been fairly met in
the statement submitted to him for confirmation and he issues a report
in which he fails to state the facts and to take a clear exception, he may
properly be subject to discipline under the provisions of the Institute's
by-laws just as fully as if the statements failed to conform to accepted
accounting principles laid down by the Institute itself. The Institute
recognizes that scrupulous observance of the standard of conduct here
laid down is called for in order that the profession's reputation for in
dependence, which is one of its most valuable attributes, shall be fully
preserved.
"Justice requires that accountants shall be held responsible for com
pliance with requirements only to the extent of their clear import or
the interpretation of them current at the time when the work was un
dertaken. Furthermore, the establishment of such requirements and com
pliance therewith by accountants in statements furnished to the pre
scribing authority do not suffice to give to the requirements the status
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of generally accepted accounting principles. Manifestly, however, it is
desirable that so far as conditions permit, the rules laid down by reg
ulatory bodies and those developed in unregulated accounting should be
in harmony. The attainment of that objective has been one of the major
purposes of the Institute in its relations with regulatory bodies."

ASSOCIATION W I T H

SCHOOLS

WHOSE

M E T H O D S A R E DISCREDITABLE
In 1929 the council of the Institute adopted the following
rule of professional conduct:
"No member or associate of the Institute shall be an officer, a direc
tor, stockholder, representative, an agent, a teacher or lecturer, nor par
ticipate in any other way in the activities or profits of any university,
college or school which conducts its operations, solicits prospective
students or advertises its courses by methods which in the opinion of
the committee on professional ethics are discreditable to the profession."
This rule arose directly out of a case in which a member
had been expelled because of association with a school, the
conduct of whose agents had been objectionable.
When the rules of professional conduct of the Institute
were revised as a whole in 1941, this rule was dropped for
the reasons that it appeared unlikely to be frequently invoked,
and that any complaint which might arise under it could be
dealt with equally well under the by-law provision for disci
pline of members found guilty of "conduct discreditable to the
profession."
INTERPRETATIONS
F o l l o w i n g are opinions expressed by committees on professional ethics o f the
American Institute of Accountants i n response to miscellaneous inquiries:
Use of "We" by Sole

Practitioners

There is no objection to use of the plural pronoun "we" in reports
and certificates by a public accountant practicing as a sole proprietor.
The committee on professional ethics has taken the position that the
use of "I" and "we," when used by a single practioner in expressing
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his professional opinion, is of little significance. An editorial in the May
1942 issue of The Journal of Accountancy deals with this question.
Retention

of Client's

Tax Data

It is not improper to permit clients, who spend only part of the year
in the state, and whose tax returns a member prepares, to leave in his
office their receipted tax bills and supporting papers to substantiate items
of income and deduction in the returns, and to give his office address
to the Treasury Department for tax purposes.
Confirmation

Notices

The use of confirmation notices should be restricted to their techni
cal purposes, although there can be no criticism of the accountant if a
legitimate notice to confirm accounts receivable happens to result in pay
ment of an account. The use of accountants' confirmation notices for
the sole purpose of collecting a client's accounts, and not in connection
with an audit or examination, is improper.
Bankruptcy
The mere fact of filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy by a mem
ber would not be regarded as cause for complaint. In an individual
case, however, the circumstances which culminated in a bankruptcy peti
tion might require investigation to determine whether or not they in
dicated conduct discreditable to the profession within the meaning of the
Institute's by-laws.
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V. C O N C L U S I O N
An effort has been made throughout this book to discuss
its subject in a wholly pragmatic manner. In the belief that
every one of the rules of professional conduct of the public
accounting profession could be amply justified as a contribution
to the enlightened self-interest of the profession itself, it
seemed unnecessary to invoke idealism or morality to support
the code.
But this is not to say that idealism or morality cannot be
invoked to strengthen the case. The system of professional
self-discipline, thoroughly sanctioned by logic and common
sense, is in addition firmly buttressed by the ideals of good
manners, fair play, and honor, which intelligent, decent men
down through the ages have respected. These ideals are firmly
rooted in tradition, which reflects the experience of centuries
that he who voluntarily submits to the time-honored precepts
of

good behavior demonstrates his capacity for leadership.
Out

of the traditional standards of proper behavior have

grown the rules of professional conduct of all the professions.
Through these rules the professions hope to provide a dis
cipline which their members will voluntarily accept, and there
by win public esteem. This will increase the fortunes of the
professions as a whole, but, even more important, the oppor
tunities of their members to serve their communities in a
useful and an honorable way.
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auditors")
Reports (see "Accountants' report or certificate")
Responsibilities of accountants and auditors
confidential relationship, 59-65
defined by Institute, 23
false or misleading statements, 15-23
forecasts of earnings, 57-8
full disclosure, 21-2
opinion or certificate, 13, 57-8
statements audited by others, 78-82
Rules of professional conduct (see "American Institute of Accountants")
Schools, methods discreditable, 122
Securities and Exchange Commission
accountant as director, 40
accountants lending money to clients, 37
accounting regulations and releases, 18
independence of accountants, 7-10, 32-4
statements not complying with SEC rules, 121-2
stockholding by family of accountant, 38
substantial financial interest, 34
Security salesman, 49
Short form report (see "Accountants' report or certificate")
Solicitation
accounting engagements, 98-9
addresses before groups, 100-1
clients of dissolved partnerships, 101
how to build practice, 99-100
Institute rule 7, 97
municipal audits, 100
predecessor accountant, 102
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Index
professional stationery, 101
sale of book with tax service, 101
Statements (see "Financial statements")
Statements on auditing procedure, 17, 21, 23
Stock ownership by accountant, 35-8
Subsidiaries, collaborating accountants, 80
Tax Court (see " U . S. Tax Court")
Tax evasion, accountant's responsibility, 64-5
Tax literature
booklets and charts, 95-6
sale of, 101
Tax practice
admission before Treasury Dept. and Tax Court, 27-8, 50
advertising by booklets, 95-6
contingent fees in, 26-7
law and accounting, relationship, 50
retention of tax data, 123
responsibility for tax evasion, 64-5
solicitation, by book with tax service, 101
Third parties, 57
Treasury Dept. (see " U . S. Treasury Dept.")
Trial board (see "American Institute of Accountants")
United States Senate
accountants' independence, 10-2
U . S. Tax Court
admission to practice before, 50
U. S. Treasury Dept.
admission to practice before, 27-8, 50
contingent fees, 27-8
disbarment causes, 27-8
firm name use, 114
solicitation or advertising, 92
"Verification of financial statements," 16
Virginia Society of Public Accountants
competitive bidding, 106
"We", by sole practitioners, 122-3
Widow of deceased partner, 70-1
Working papers
ownership of, 62-3
privileged, 62
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